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INTRODUCTION 
Americans prize privacy, particularly from government intrusion, and 
our Constitution provides fundamental privacy protections.  For example, 
the Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.”1  Notwithstanding these Constitutional protections, Congress 
has found it necessary to authorize the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to 
use mandatory measures to collect a comprehensive body of personal 
financial information about each American, in order to ensure compliance 
with the federal income tax.2  Increasingly, the IRS stores this information 
in digital form and frequently3 shares it with other agencies of the federal 
government and the states.4  Some commentators view this collection of 
                                                          
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 2. See, e.g., PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM’N, REPORT OF THE PRIVACY 
PROTECTION STUDY COMM’N:  THE CITIZEN AS TAXPAYER 6 (1977) [hereinafter PRIVACY 
COMM’N REPORT] (stating that “[t]o fulfill the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code, 
the Internal Revenue Service collects and maintains vast amounts of information about all 
individual taxpayers.  Congress has determined that the compelling societal need to finance 
government activities warrants the intrusion into the lives of individuals that compliance 
with the Internal Revenue Code inevitably entails.”); see also William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s 
Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1032 (1995) 
(explaining that “[t]he government needs certain kinds of information from taxpayers in 
order to enforce the tax laws.  It cannot require disclosure only in cases in which it has some 
basis for suspecting a violation, because then it could not uncover violations”). 
 3. Congress’s concern about disclosures by the IRS to other government agencies is 
not a recent development.  The Privacy Act of 1974 directed the Privacy Commission to 
examine this issue.  Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5(c)(2)(B)(ii), 88 Stat. 1896 (1974).  Prior to 
1974, Congress had “delegated to the Executive branch substantial discretion to decide to 
what extent, and under what conditions, tax returns and other information about taxpayers 
would be disclosed by the Service to other government agencies.”  PRIVACY COMM’N 
REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.  Because of certain exceptions in the Privacy Act of 1974, the 
IRS did not “interpre[t] it as prohibiting disclosures of records about individuals currently 
authorized by regulation.”  Id. at 2-3.  After a preliminary report was issued by the 
Commission, Congress adopted a comprehensive amendment to the rules regarding tax 
return disclosure in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).  
Subsequently, the Commission revised its report and stated that “[t]he Tax Reform Act of 
1976 is consistent in the main with the Commission’s general recommendations.”  PRIVACY 
COMM’N REPORT, supra note 2, at 30; see also JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., 
STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS AS 
REQUIRED BY SECTION 3802 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND 
REFORM ACT OF 1998, VOLUME I:  STUDY OF GENERAL DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS 128 (Comm. 
Print 2000) [hereinafter 2000 JCT REPORT] (providing a more recent review of these rules). 
 4. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing situations in which the IRS is authorized to 
disclose tax return information to other government agencies).  Some commentators have 
proposed that certain information about specific tax returns be released publicly.  See, e.g., 
Stephen W. Mazza, Tax Compliance:  Should Congress Reform the 1998 Reform Act?  
Taxpayer Privacy and Taxpayer Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1065, 1070, 1142 (2003) 
(arguing that the IRS should be allowed to publicly release  information about a taxpayer’s 
“criminal tax evasion; failure to pay assessed taxes; and investments in abusive tax 
shelters”); see also Marc Linder, “Tax Glasnost” for Millionaires:  Peeking Behind the Veil 
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information by the IRS as an unacceptable invasion of privacy; they urge 
that privacy be restored to Americans by replacing the income tax with a 
“flat tax,” a form of consumption tax.5  They emphasize that, under the flat 
tax,6 most taxpayers would be required to file only a postcard-sized return, 
in contrast to the extensive reporting required on the current Form 1040.7 
President Bush has recently announced his intention to pursue tax reform 
in his second term and has appointed an advisory panel to examine various 
options, including adoption of the flat tax.8  This Article seeks to contribute 
to the upcoming debate by examining whether the issue of privacy should 
provide a strong argument in favor of replacing the income tax with a flat 
tax. 
                                                                                                                                      
of Ignorance Along the Publicity-Privacy Continuum, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
951, 959-60 (1990-1991) (recommending that the tax returns of millionaires be made public 
to foster public debate about income disparities and redistribution). 
 5. See generally DAN MITCHELL, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INNOVATION, TAX REFORM:  
THE KEY TO PRESERVING PRIVACY AND COMPETITION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 9 (2002) 
(arguing that “fundamental tax reform is the solution to an invasive tax code that gives 
government the right to know every detail about a taxpayer’s financial existence”), 
available at http://www.ipi.org.  Mitchell also states that “the reduction of government 
prying is sufficient reason to scrap the Internal Revenue Code.”  Id. at 2.  Mitchell 
concludes that “[t]ax reform is a way of returning privacy and control to the American 
people.”  Id. at 10; see also CATO INSTITUTE, Fundamental Tax Reform, in CATO HANDBOOK 
FOR CONGRESS, 106TH CONGRESS 57, 69 (2001) (arguing that “[n]o other institution is as 
great a threat to our civil liberties as the IRS.  Congress has tried to transform the IRS into a 
kinder, gentler agency.  But the truth is that IRS abuses will assuredly continue as long as 
we retain a flawed income tax system”); Stephen Moore, The Economic and Civil Liberties 
Case for a National Sales Tax, 71 TAX NOTES 101, 103-04 (1996) (explaining that “without 
a search warrant, the IRS has the right to search the property and financial documents of 
American citizens,” and noting that in 1995, “Congress added 5,000 IRS agents even as it 
was forced to acknowledge that hundreds of auditors were illegally scouring through the 
returns of American citizens”).  Moore argues that the retail sales tax, and not the flat tax, 
would cause our tax system to be less intrusive.  Id. at 104. 
 6. Privacy is not the only reason offered for replacing the income tax with the flat tax.  
Flat tax advocates also claim that the flat tax is fairer and easier to administer than the 
income tax, and that the flat tax would stimulate savings and economic growth.  See, e.g., 
MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 2 (arguing that “the loss of privacy [under the income tax] is a 
result of bad tax policy”).  Opponents of the flat tax argue that the income tax is fairer and 
that predictions of an improved economy and greater administrative simplicity under the flat 
tax are exaggerated.  See generally Stephen B. Cohen, The Vanishing Case for Flat Tax 
Reform, 86 TAX NOTES 675, 690 (2000) (concluding that “[p]redictions that the flat tax 
would benefit the middle and lower classes should be viewed skeptically”; “the flat tax 
seems as likely to decrease as to increase savings”; and “much of the flat tax’s promised 
simplification for individuals could be achieved by reforming the existing income tax”).  
This Article will not attempt to resolve this controversy.  Rather it is limited to the goal of 
determining what role, if any, privacy concerns should play in the upcoming tax reform 
debate. 
 7. See MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 9 (explaining that the flat tax would replace current 
tax forms with two postcards—one designed for households and one for businesses). 
 8. Exec. Order No. 13,369, 70 Fed. Reg. 2323 (Jan. 7, 2005), available at 
http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/executive-order.shtml. See generally Martin A. Sullivan, 
Economic Analysis,  Waiting for Tax Reform:  A Commission Report Preview, 106 TAX 
NOTES 152 (2005) (predicting the recommendations of President Bush’s advisory panel); 
Heidi Glenn, Bush Panel to Outline Tax Reform Options by July 31, 2005 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 6-1 ¶ 12 (Jan. 10, 2005)(on file with the American University Law Review) 
(describing the purview of the nine-member bipartisan panel appointed by the President). 
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Part I will briefly describe the flat tax, and Part II will consider what 
changes in IRS information-gathering would occur if a flat tax is adopted.  
The most salient change is that, under a flat tax, the IRS would no longer 
routinely collect information about dividends, interest, and capital gains 
received by taxpayers.  Part III will examine whether the IRS’s current 
collection and use of this category of information is, in fact, as dangerous 
and harmful as flat tax advocates contend.  This Part also will examine 
whether the flat tax would avoid any harms found to occur under the 
income tax. Next this Part will analyze the difficulties that other 
government agencies and units would face if the IRS no longer collected 
and shared this information. 
In conclusion, this Article notes that dividends, interest, and capital gains 
are highly concentrated among wealthy taxpayers, so that any 
improvements in privacy resulting from adoption of the flat tax would be 
unevenly distributed among Americans.  It also concludes that the privacy 
of Americans would be better served by retention of the income tax and 
renewed efforts to protect against misuse of the information that the IRS 
collects. 
I.   BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE FLAT TAX 
The “flat tax,” originally proposed by Robert E. Hall and Alvin 
Rabushka in 1981,9 has been the basis for legislative proposals by Senator 
                                                          
 9. ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX vii (2d ed. 1995) (reviewing 
history of their flat tax proposal).  See generally GEN. ACCT. OFF., REPORT ON THE 
POTENTIAL IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE TAXES ON TAXPAYERS AND ADMINISTRATORS (1998) 
[hereinafter ALTERNATIVE TAXES] (outlining the major differences in alternative tax systems 
and considering the potential burdens on taxpayers and responsibilities for the government 
under those alternative systems); STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., 
DISCUSSION OF ISSUES RELATING TO “FLAT” TAX RATE PROPOSALS SCHEDULED FOR A PUBLIC 
HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE (Joint Comm. Print 1995) (outlining 
the present structure of the income tax system and proposals for the flat tax); MICHAEL 
GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 212-43 (1997) (recounting the 
recent movement to reform the taxation system); Neil H. Buchanan, A User’s Guide to 
Proposals to Replace the U.S. Tax System and Strangle Fiscal Policy, 33 J. ECON. ISSUES 
505, 509 (1999) (suggesting that the “true agenda” of the flat tax proposal is to “shift the tax 
burden downward”); Michael Calegari, Flat Taxes and Effective Tax Planning, 51 NAT’L 
TAX J. 689 (1998) (describing potential tax avoidance strategies taxpayers could use under 
the Hall-Rabushka plan); Marvin A. Chirelstein, The Flat Tax Proposal—Will Voters 
Understand the Issues?, 2 GREEN BAG 147 (1999) (analyzing how political rhetoric creates 
misunderstanding of flat tax proposals); Alan L. Feld, Living with the Flat Tax, 48 NAT’L 
TAX J. 603 (1995) (arguing that a flat tax will not simplify taxation as its proponents 
suggest); William G. Gale, Tax Simplification:  Issues and Options, 92 TAX NOTES 1463, 
1478-81 (2001) [hereinafter Gale, Tax Simplification] (discussing potential sources of 
complexity under the flat tax); William G. Gale & Kevin A. Hassett, A Framework for 
Evaluating the Flat Tax, 98 TAX NOTES TODAY 42-37, ¶¶ 2-3 (Mar. 3, 1998) (on file with 
the American University Law Review) (analyzing the Hall-Rabushka flat tax as a 
consumption tax); Lawrence J. Kotlikoff, Consumption Taxation—The A,B,C’s That Every 
Politician Should Know, 48 EMORY L.J. 823 (1999) (outlining the basic differences between 
various types of consumption taxation systems); Jerome Kurtz, Two Cheers for the Income 
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Arlen Specter (R-Pa.)10 and Senator Richard C. Shelby (R.-Ala.).11  Under 
the Hall-Rabushka proposal, the Form 1040 for individuals would be 
replaced with a “postcard return,” on which the taxpayer would identify 
himself by name, home address, occupation and social security number. 
The only two items of income reported on the return would be “wages and 
salary” on line 1 and “pension and retirement benefits” on line 2.  A 
personal allowance (similar to a standard deduction) would be claimed 
based on whether the taxpayer’s filing status is “married filing jointly,” 
“single,” or “single head of household.”  In addition, a smaller personal 
allowance would be allowed for each dependent.12  As under the current 
system, employers would continue to withhold taxes from a taxpayer’s 
                                                                                                                                      
Tax, 27 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 161 (2001) (arguing that transition to an alternative tax system is 
administratively and politically unmanageable and that the current tax system is the fairest 
possible); Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Simplicity of the Flat Tax:  Is It Unique?, 14 AM. J. 
TAX POL’Y 283 (1997) (examining whether simplifications often associated with the flat tax 
are unique to it or whether they could be found in other proposals); John K. McNulty, Flat 
Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in the United States:  A 
Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2095 (2000) (arguing 
against adoption of the flat tax in light of the history of income taxation in the United States 
and possible modifications to the current system); Stephen Moore, The “Freedom to 
Choose” Flat Tax, 97 TAX NOTES 1609 (2002) (arguing that successful adoption of the flat 
tax will require a different political strategy); Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax 
Complexity:  How Much Simplicity Can Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. 
REV. 151 (1997) (noting that the desire for equitable distribution of tax liabilities has 
resulted in tax system complexity); Ronald A. Pearlman, Fresh From the River Styx:  The 
Achilles’ Heels of Tax Reform Proposals, 51 NAT’L TAX J. 569 (1998) (explaining the tax 
avoidance and tax evasion opportunities implicit in various tax reform proposals); Julie 
Roin, The Consequences of Undoing the Federal Income Tax, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 319 (2003) 
(noting how the current taxation system is intertwined with American economic and cultural 
life); Robert P. Strauss, Administrative and Revenue Implications of Alternative Federal 
Consumption Taxes for the State and Local Sector, 14 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 361 (1997) 
(considering the effects of a federal consumption tax on local and state economies); Alvin 
C. Warren, Jr., Three Versions of Tax Reform, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157 (1997) 
(analyzing three proposals for tax reform and comparing the current taxation system to that 
of other developed nations); David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
599 (2000) (arguing that claims of simplicity and efficiency by flat tax proponents are not 
accurate); William G. Gale, Tax Reform in the Real World, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 387 (1998) 
(reviewing GRAETZ, supra) (noting that thoughtful tax reform proposals must consider the 
history and politics of taxation in the United States); Grover Norquist, Step-by-Step Tax 
Reform, WASH. POST, June 9, 2003, at A21 (arguing that each Bush administration tax cut 
represents a movement towards fundamental tax reform). 
 10. Flat Tax Act of 2003, S. 907, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 11. Tax Simplification Act of 2003, S. 1040, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 12. In the 1995 Hall-Rabushka version, the figures for the basic standard deduction are 
$16,500 for “married filing jointly,” $9,500 for “single,” and $14,000 for “single head of 
household”; the amount for each dependent is $4,500.  HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 9, at 
59.  Under the Flat Tax Act of 2003, the basic standard deduction would be $17,500 on a 
joint return, $15,000 for a head of household, and $10,000 for an unmarried individual who 
is not a head of household.  § 2.  There would be an additional standard deduction of $5,000 
for each dependent.  Id.  Under S. 1040, the basic standard deduction is $25,580 on a joint 
return, $16,330 for a head of household, and $12,790 for an unmarried individual who is not 
a head of household.  Tax Simplification Act § 101.  The additional standard deduction for 
each dependent is $5,510.  Id. 
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wages.13 All income would be taxed at a single rate.14 
In addition, any individual or entity engaged in the conduct of a trade or 
business would be required to file a business tax form in the name of the 
business.15  On this form, the taxpayer would record two items:  “gross 
revenue from sales” and “allowable costs.”  Allowable costs would include 
“purchases of goods, services and materials, wages, salaries and pensions, 
and purchases of capital equipment, structures and land.”16  The wages and 
pensions deducted on this business tax form would, however, be included 
on the individual tax return of the employee. 
 
II.   HOW WOULD IRS INFORMATION-GATHERING CHANGE UNDER THE 
FLAT TAX?  
A.  What Would Not Change 
In order to highlight the changes in information-gathering that would 
occur under the flat tax, it is useful to consider first the many aspects of 
IRS information collection that would not change. 
Under the flat tax, an individual would continue to file an annual 
personal return showing amounts received as wages or pension 
distributions, if any.  The taxpayer would continue to report income from a 
sole proprietorship, although this would be on a separate business return.17  
An individual filing a personal return would indicate the appropriate filing 
status, the number of his dependents, and their Social Security numbers.18  
                                                          
 13. HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 9, at 59, 145. 
 14. Id. at 52.  In the 1995 Hall-Rabushka plan, this would be nineteen percent.  Id. at 
56.  The Tax Simplification Act sets the rate at nineteen percent initially, with a subsequent 
decrease to seventeen percent.  Tax Simplification Act § 101.  The Flat Tax Act sets the rate 
at twenty percent.  Flat Tax Act § 2. 
 15. HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 9, at 61-64. 
 16. Id. at 62. 
 17. However, one could show compensation for personal services in one’s business on 
the personal return in order to use the basic standard deduction and dependency exemptions.  
See, e.g., Flat Tax Act § 2.  Under the income tax, an individual engaged in the conduct of a 
business as a sole proprietor shows the receipts and deductible expenditures of the business 
on a Schedule C attached to the Form 1040. 
 18. It seems likely that the flat tax would incorporate, in its rules for the dependency 
exemption and head of household filing status, the uniform definition of a “qualifying child” 
adopted by Congress in October 2004.  See Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. 
L. No. 108-311, tit. II, § 201, amending I.R.C. § 152, 118 Stat. 1166, 1170 (2004) (defining 
a “qualifying child” as an individual “who bears a relationship” to the taxpayer; “who has 
the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of such taxable 
year”; who meets certain age requirements; and “who has not provided over one-half of 
such individual’s own support for the calendar year in which the taxable year of the 
taxpayer begins”).  Under the Working Families Tax Relief Act, the “support test” for 
claiming a dependency exemption is no longer applicable with respect to a “qualifying 
child” of the taxpayer; however, the child may not provide more than one-half of his own 
support.  § 201, 118 Stat. at 1170.  A “qualifying child” must be shown to have had the 
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In addition, the IRS would continue to receive a Form W-2 from anyone 
employing the taxpayer as an employee, a Form 1099-MISC from any 
business paying fees to the taxpayer as an independent contractor, and a 
Form 1099-R from any payor of pension distributions to the taxpayer. 
Under the flat tax, as with the income tax, filing a tax return would not 
necessarily mark the end of information-gathering by the IRS.19  As under 
current law, the IRS could be expected to demand substantiation for some 
taxpayers’ claims of favorable filing status and of dependency 
exemptions,20 particularly when two taxpayers take conflicting positions.21  
The audit of a business return would be similar to the audit of a taxpayer’s 
Schedule C under current law.  The IRS would seek to determine whether 
                                                                                                                                      
same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of the taxable year.  Id.  
The legislation does not eliminate the requirement, for claiming head of household status, 
that the taxpayer pay more than half of the cost of maintaining as a home the household that 
is the principal place of abode of the taxpayer and child for the current year.  Working 
Families Tax Relief Act § 202, 118 Stat. at 1175. 
 19. Congress has given the IRS explicit authority to examine any books or records 
which may be relevant to determining an individual’s tax liability, to issue a summons to the 
taxpayer or other persons to produce such books or records, or to give testimony under oath 
which is relevant to such a determination.  I.R.C. § 7602 (2005).  Federal district courts are 
authorized to compel compliance with such summons and to use the contempt power toward 
this end.  I.R.C. § 7604 (2005); see also United States v. Powell, 279 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964) 
(holding that the IRS Commissioner “need not meet any standard of probable cause to 
obtain enforcement of his summons [and that h]e must show that the investigation will be 
conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, 
that the information sought is not within the Commissioner’s possession, and that the 
administrative steps required by the Code have been followed”).  See generally Bryan T. 
Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm Shift in the 
IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (2004) (noting that the 
IRS “gathers the information it needs to determine taxes voluntarily from taxpayers and 
third parties through the return system, through various information-sharing agreements 
with federal and state agencies, through access to the vast public database of courthouse 
records and through informal requests”).  In most cases, the IRS simply requests—and 
usually receives—the information it needs.  Id.  When a taxpayer or a third party refuses to 
provide information to the IRS, it may issue a summons.  Id.; see also Mazza, supra note 4, 
at 1099 (explaining the IRS summons enforcement procedure).  In some cases, the IRS may 
elect to make an estimated assessment based on available information, ultimately forcing the 
recalcitrant taxpayer to turn over the information to the Tax Court so as to avoid an adverse 
decision.  Camp, supra, at 32 n.147 (citing William L. Raby, TCMP, Economic Reality, and 
IRS Summons Power, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 140-97 (July 19, 1995) (on file with the 
American University Law Review)). 
 20. See William G. Gale & Janet Holtzblatt, The Role of Administrative Issues in Tax 
Reform:  Simplicity, Compliance and Administration, in UNITED STATES TAX REFORM IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 179, 206-07 (George R. Zodrow & Peter Mieskowski eds., 2002) (noting that 
determination of the number of a taxpayer’s qualified dependents would be just as difficult 
under the flat tax as under the income tax). 
 21. To establish that a child had the same principal abode as the taxpayer for more than 
half of the taxable year, the taxpayer probably would have to produce the type of proof 
currently called for under Form 8836 (relating to the earned income tax credit).  For 
example, that proof might consist of a third party affidavit from a clergyman or of records or 
a signed letter on letterhead from a child-care provider, a social service agency, doctor, 
parole officer, or landlord.  See I.R.S. Form 8836 and accompanying instructions (2004), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f8836 
.pdf. 
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business receipts were reported in full, whether expenses were 
substantiated, and whether payments of personal expenses were disguised 
as business inputs; the IRS would also examine payments of wages to 
owners and family members.22 
Additionally, if the IRS suspects the existence of significant amounts of 
unreported wage income on a personal return or of business income on a 
business return,23 it might well seek to develop a detailed and 
comprehensive picture of a taxpayer’s financial transactions, including 
consumption expenditures and investments.24  Thus, as under current law, 
                                                          
 22. See Chirelstein, supra note 9, at 155 (stating that “borderline business expense 
issues” such as whether a car is used for business or personal purposes, whether certain 
travel expenses are for business or personal purposes, or whether an “alleged home office is 
in fact an ‘office’ . . . would be no less contestable under the Flat Tax”); see also Lester B. 
Snyder & Marianne Gallegos, Redefining the Role of the Federal Income Tax:  Taking the 
Tax Law “Private” Through the Flat Tax and Other Consumption Taxes, 13 AM. J. TAX 
POL’Y 1, 72 n.278 (1996) (noting that “restrictions on home office and travel costs, which 
attempt to filter out the personal from the business side of the self-employed person’s 
expenses, would not appear to be any less complicated under the consumption tax 
proposals”); Weisbach, supra note 9, at 645-49 (suggesting the need for a “small business” 
exemption under a flat tax).  Drawing on examples from Feld, supra note 9, Weisbach notes 
that there would be “significant valuation problems” when assets (such as a room in a 
personal residence) were contributed to or withdrawn from a business, and “allocation of 
personal consumption and business would be difficult.”  Id.  He argues that the latter 
problem would be more acute under the flat tax than under the current tax because “there is 
a sharper distinction between businesses and individuals under the Flat Tax.”  Id.; see also 
Gale, Tax Simplification, supra note 9, at 1478 (“Some areas of the existing tax code are 
also common to the flat tax and would prove just as difficult as ever.  These include rules 
regarding independent contractors versus employees, qualified dependents, tax withholding 
for household help, home office deductions, taxation of the self-employed.”).  Gale notes 
that “the treatment of travel and food expenses might also cause problems” because 
businesses would not be allowed to deduct them if they constitute a fringe benefit.  Id.  In 
addition, “[c]onversion of business property to individual use ought to generate taxable 
income for the business, but would be hard to monitor.”  Id. at 1479. 
 23. See ALTERNATIVE TAXES, supra note 9, at 170 (noting that under the flat tax 
“[i]ssues of noncompliance, such as with sole proprietors/independent contractors, now 
troublesome to the IRS, would not likely change much with a flat tax, and there is nothing 
apparent in this tax system that would solve the current problems with underreported or 
unreported income, particularly of small businesses”).  In addition, “[a]n underground 
economy would seem to be able to operate in much the same way with a flat tax as with the 
current system, because no obvious deterrent would seem to be available to prevent both 
legal and illegal transactions from occurring outside the tax system.”  Id. 
 24. See ROBERT E. MELDMAN & RICHARD J. SIDEMAN, FEDERAL TAXATION PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 19 (2001) (explaining indirect methods of proving income such as the 
Cash T-Account Method, Net Worth Method, and Source and Application of Funds 
Method); see also  GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION:  MORE CRITERIA 
NEEDED ON IRS’ USE OF FINANCIAL STATUS AUDIT TECHNIQUES (1997) (reviewing IRS 
practices in connection with so-called “financial status” audits, which are used to search for 
unreported income).  The General Accounting Office estimated that during 1995 and 1996, 
twenty-two percent of a total of 421,000 audits used a “financial audit status” technique.  Id. 
at 4.  However, the technique was used in only seven percent of audits involving returns 
with no business or farm income.  Id. at 9.  See generally Douglas Frazer, Lifestyle Audit 
Aims to Uncover Tax Cheating, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 12, 1996, at 6 (stating that 
taxpayers view financial status audits as government interference and it is clear that the 
audits blur “the distinction between civil audits and criminal investigations”).  Under the 
IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, use of “financial status or economic reality 
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the IRS might obtain a taxpayer’s bank or credit card records by way of a 
third-party summons if the taxpayer did not provide them voluntarily.25 
Finally, under the flat tax as under the current tax, the IRS would 
continue to have the task of collecting taxes not collected by withholding or 
paid with the return.26  Tax collection with respect to the business return 
would be as difficult as under current law.  Collection problems with 
respect to the personal return would be less likely than under the Form 
1040,27 but would continue to be significant.28  If collection action is 
necessary, the IRS would seek extensive financial information about the 
taxpayer to determine how much could realistically be paid under an 
                                                                                                                                      
examination techniques to determine the existence of unreported income of any taxpayer” is 
permitted only if “the Secretary has a reasonable indication that there is a likelihood of such 
unreported income.”  Pub. L. No. 105-206, §§ 3412, 3417(a), 112 Stat. 685, 751 (codified as 
amended at I.R.C. § 7602(e) (West 2002)).  Camp explains that “the open-ended nature of 
these audits created significant opposition among tax practitioners, taxpayers and 
politicians.”  Camp, supra note 19, at 23 n.94, citing Barbara Whitaker, When the I.R.S. 
Agent Peeks Under the Mattress, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1996, at F8; Stephen Moore, 
Remarks of CATO Institute at IRS Restructuring Meeting, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 75-39 ¶ 14 
(Apr. 18, 1997) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 25. I.R.C. § 7609 (2005).  This section of the Code imposes special procedures, 
including notice, for a third-party summons.  Id.; see also Camp, supra note 19, at 64-72 
(considering the scope of the IRS’s authority, specifically with regard to obtaining records 
from a taxpayer’s employer); Mazza, supra note 4, at 1100-01 (noting that “the IRS’s 
expansive authority to obtain taxpayer information also extends to facts and records held by 
third parties, including the taxpayer’s employer, bank, customers, and business associates”).  
In United States v. Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a bank depositor “takes the risk, 
in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to 
the Government,” and that the obtaining of those records by the U.S. Attorney’s office by 
means of a grand jury subpoena was not an “intrusion upon the depositors’ Fourth 
Amendment rights.”  425 U.S. 435, 443-44 (1976).  In response to that decision, Congress 
enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (West 2002)).  See generally Matthew N. 
Kleiman, Comment, The Right to Financial Privacy Versus Computerized Law 
Enforcement:  A New Fight in an Old Battle, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1169, 1187-90 (1992) 
(discussing Miller and Congress’s response to concerns about personal privacy violations by 
the IRS).  However, the Tenth Circuit has concluded that “there is no basis for saying that 
[the Financial Privacy Act of 1978] overrides the summons authority contained in the 
I.R.C.”  United States v. MacKay, 608 F.2d 830, 834 (10th Cir. 1979). 
 26. See MELDMAN & SIDEMAN, supra note 24, § 14 (discussing the collection process); 
see also Mazza, supra note 4, at 1127-35 (proposing that the IRS be permitted to publicize 
delinquent tax accounts); Amy Hamilton, IRS Considers Privatizing Tax Collection, and a 
Lot More, 98 TAX NOTES 652 (2003) (considering proposals to privatize various 
administrative aspects of the IRS’s collections procedures).  See generally Christina N. 
Smith, Note, The Limits of Privatization:  Privacy in the Context of Tax Collection, 47 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 627 (1997) (arguing against tax collection privatization proposals in the 
interest of protecting personal privacy interests). 
 27. See ALTERNATIVE TAXES, supra note 9, at 171 (suggesting that with the elimination 
of “information reports of earnings from savings and investments” and of audit issues 
relating to “capital gains and itemized deductions,” there would be a decline in “matches 
with taxpayer data and related audit issues and findings,” which would in turn “affect the 
need for collection follow-up with individuals”). 
 28. An individual taxpayer may elect not to have withholding with respect to pension 
distributions.  In addition, withholding with respect to wages is not always adequate, and 
taxes might be higher than expected if the individual’s filing status or dependency 
exemptions are challenged. 
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installment plan, whether it would be worthwhile to accept reduced 
payment pursuant to an offer in compromise, what flows of income (such 
as wages or pensions) could be garnished, and what assets could be seized, 
if no agreement is reached with the taxpayer.29  
B.  What Would Change 
Under the Hall-Rabushka proposal, expenditures made by individuals, 
except pursuant to a business, would no longer yield deductions and 
credits.30  Therefore, taxpayers would no longer be required to reveal on 
their returns (and the IRS would not need to confirm) the amounts of 
various expenditures that currently form the basis for such deductions and 
credits, such as alimony, fees for child care, IRA contributions, higher-
education tuition, moving expenses, charitable contributions, state and local 
taxes, medical or dental expenses, interest expenses, or job-related or 
investment-related expenses. 
Information regarding these expenditures is often considered to be 
particularly sensitive.  For example, contributions to religious groups and 
other charities may reveal a great deal about one’s personal beliefs and 
associations.  Payments for medical expenses relate to a very sensitive 
aspect of our lives, our physical and mental health, and have important 
implications for our personal relationships, employment, and sense of well-
being.  Nevertheless, flat tax advocates have not focused on these items in 
making the argument that the flat tax would enhance our privacy.  A reason 
may be that, under the income tax, one arguably has a choice about whether 
to claim these deductions on one’s return.  More importantly, it is by no 
means certain that the deduction for charitable contributions (or other 
itemized deductions) would in fact be eliminated if a flat tax is enacted.31  
                                                          
 29. See generally MELDMAN & SIDEMAN, supra note 24, § 14. 
 30. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 9, at 58-59 (proposing a flat tax in which 
charitable deductions and mortgage interest deductions as well as dividend taxes, capital 
gains taxes, and interest taxes would be eliminated). 
 31. See, e.g., Flat Tax Act of 2003, S. 907, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003) (retaining limited 
deductions for home mortgage interest and charitable contributions, allowing a deduction 
for interest incurred with respect to acquisition indebtedness of up to $100,000 and a 
deduction of up to $2,500 for charitable contributions made in cash); Tax Simplification Act 
of 2003, S. 1040, 108th Cong. (2003) (not permitting these deductions); see also Exec. 
Order No. 13369, 70 Fed. Reg. 2323 (Jan. 7, 2005) (appointing a tax reform advisory panel 
and specifying that the panel’s recommendations should “recogniz[e] the importance of 
homeownership and charity in American society”); Chirelstein, supra note 9, at 154 
(questioning whether those taxpayers who currently itemize would “really welcome” 
elimination of itemized deductions under the flat tax “in exchange for [the promised] 
lowered tax rate”); Gale & Hassett, supra note 9, ¶ 30 (arguing that if the flat tax is adopted, 
“there will be pressure to retain each of several major deductions and possibly many minor 
ones as well.  The key ones include:  the tax exclusion for employer-financed health 
insurance; the earned income credit; the deduction for charitable contributions, tax 
preferences for housing, especially, the deductibility of mortgage interest and property 
taxes; and deductions for state and local income taxes.”); Kurtz, supra note 9, at 166 (stating 
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Finally, these and other personal deductions could just as easily be 
eliminated by reforming the current income tax system, without adopting 
the flat tax.32 
Instead, flat tax advocates direct attention to the fact that the flat tax 
would eliminate the need for reporting33 investment income,34 primarily 
interest, dividends, and capital gains.35  By contrast, under the income tax, 
these items are annually reported by the taxpayer on Form 104036 and by 
payers on Form 1099.37 
                                                                                                                                      
that “I am convinced that most of the personal deductions and exclusions would reappear as 
part of the Flat Tax . . . . If there exists the fortitude in our lawmakers to resist these 
pleadings for relief under the Flat Tax, that same fortitude should support a serious effort to 
simplify our current income tax by eliminating many or most personal deductions”). 
 32. See Chirelstein, supra note 9, at 154-55 (contending that “there is nothing inherent 
in our present income tax that requires us to retain [the itemized] deductions even now.  The 
fact is that we choose to retain them despite the record-keeping burdens they entail just 
because we consider that the activities they support—home-ownership, for example—are 
deserving and desirable and merit a subsidy via the tax system . . . [Without adopting the flat 
tax,] we could make the standard deduction universal under the income tax and consign the 
personal expense deductions to the ash heap of history.”); see also McClure, supra note 9, at 
286-87 (arguing that the simplification benefits offered by the flat tax are “not unique to the 
flat tax”). 
 33. See Robert P. Strauss, Administrative and Revenue Implications of Alternative 
Federal Consumption Taxes for the State and Local Sector, 14 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 361, 419-
23 (1997) (discussing the impact of this change on state and local tax administration). 
 34. The flat tax would also eliminate the need for reporting of certain other 
miscellaneous items of income (not earned in a business) that are reported under the income 
tax.  These include cancellation of indebtedness income, lottery and gambling winnings, 
receipts from a hobby, income from treasure trove, alimony, Social Security benefits, prizes 
(that are not employment-related), certain illegal receipts, such as amounts embezzled, and 
damages from a lawsuit (which are reportable under the income tax when they are punitive 
or are not from a personal physical injury). 
 35. See Mitchell, supra note 5, at 10.  Other investment income not taxable under the 
flat tax might include rent from investment real estate and royalties not received as part of a 
business. 
 36. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAX:  PUBLICATION 17,  66, 71 
(2004) (indicating that under the income tax, receipts of interest must be shown on Schedule 
B to Form 1040, when taxable interest exceeds $1500, and taxable dividends of more than 
$1500 must be shown on Schedule B), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p17/index.html.  Schedule B also requires an individual 
taxpayer to reveal any authority over any foreign bank or securities account. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, 2004 INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULES A AND B (FORM 1040), at B-2.  Capital gains 
are shown on Schedule D.  Publication 17, at 116. 
 37. See I.R.C. § 6042 (West 2002) (providing information on reporting requirements for 
dividends); I.R.C. § 6045 (West 2002) (brokers); I.R.C. § 6049 (2005) (interest); see also 
JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES:  A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE GREAT 
DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 160-61 (2d ed. 2000) (noting that “[f]or types of income subject 
to information reporting, and especially for those with tax withholding at the source of 
payment, evasion is much less prevalent”); Gale & Holtzblatt, supra note 20, at 192-93 
(discussing misreported income on individual tax returns); Camp, supra note 19, at 9-10 
(explaining that the IRS “uses information returns to monitor and enforce the duty to report 
all income and has become increasingly sophisticated in doing so.  In 2001, for example, it 
was able to verify about eighty percent of reported income through matching.”). 
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III.  HOW IMPORTANT ARE THE CHANGES IN TERMS OF PRIVACY? 
Privacy has been defined as “a limitation of others’ access to an 
individual.”38  Conversely, we see that a “loss of privacy” involves 
obtaining access to an individual.39  Under the income tax, the IRS needs to 
obtain routine access to information about an individual’s investment 
income; under the flat tax it generally40 does not. 
Lack of privacy has been linked to a wide variety of harms, including 
improper interference with one’s property, actions, political associations, or 
safety; unwarranted harm to one’s reputation; excessive pressure to 
conform to social norms that stifles one’s creativity and autonomy; loss of 
one’s dignity; and the inability to relax or concentrate.41  On the other hand, 
too much privacy may interfere with appropriate accountability to others, 
so one cannot simply conclude that more privacy is better than less 
privacy.42  Therefore, it is necessary to look at the particular context43—the 
IRS obtaining information about a taxpayer’s investments under the income 
tax—and to evaluate the particular harms that this activity may entail. 
                                                          
 38. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF 
PRIVACY:  AN ANTHOLOGY 346, 351 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984). 
 39. See id. at 350-51 (noting that “[a] loss of privacy occurs as others obtain 
information about an individual, pay attention to him or gain access to him . . .  These three 
elements of secrecy, anonymity, and solitude are distinct and independent, but 
interrelated”). 
 40. As noted above, the IRS may require access to information about investments, when 
using an indirect method to determine the amount of any unreported income; it would also 
need access when it must pursue collection. 
 41. See Gavison, supra note 38, at 363 (explaining that privacy “severs the individual’s 
conduct from knowledge of that conduct by others,” and thus “prevents interference, 
pressures to conform, ridicule, punishment, unfavorable decisions, and other forms of 
hostile reaction”).  This may have the desirable effects of promoting “learning, creativity, 
and autonomy,” contributing to “mental health,” and “enhanc[ing] the capacity of 
individuals to create and maintain human relations of different intensities.”  Id. at 364-65.  
Privacy also protects us from types of “exposure” that threaten “an individual’s dignity.”  Id. 
at 369.  Freedom from “physical access” allows us to concentrate, relax, or maintain 
intimate relations.  Id. at 363.  Gavison points out that privacy by contributing to “moral 
autonomy” and allowing “liberty of political action” is essential to the functioning of a 
democratic society.  Id. at 369-70. 
 42. See, e.g., id. at 366 (recognizing that privacy is not always beneficial for society 
when it “permit[s] individuals to escape responsibility for their actions”).  Gavison suggests 
that “privacy will only be desirable when the liberty of action that it promotes is itself 
desirable, or at least permissible.”  Id. at 366; see also Anita L. Allen, Privacy-as-Data 
Control:  Conceptual, Practical, and Moral Limits of the Paradigm, 32 CONN. L. REV. 861, 
872 (2000) (arguing that many public benefits require “moral accountability in the form of 
personal financial disclosures”). 
 43. Helen Nissenbaum argues that 
[W]hether a particular action is determined a violation of privacy is a function of 
several different variables, including the nature of the situation, or context; the 
nature of the information in relation to that context; the roles of agents receiving 
information; their relationships to information subjects; on what terms the 
information is shared by the subject; and the terms of further dissemination. 
Helen Nissenbaum, Technology, Values and the Justice System:  Privacy as Contextual 
Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 155 (2004). 
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A.  How Is the Information Obtained? 
Some of the harms associated with an individual’s loss of privacy result 
from the manner in which others obtain access to the individual, as 
compared to the fact of others having or misusing information about the 
individual, however obtained.44 
The two complementary means by which the IRS generally obtains 
access to information about a taxpayer’s investment income are by the 
individual reporting the information on a Form 1040, or by a payer or 
broker reporting the information to the IRS on a Form 1099.  These twin 
reporting systems are mandatory, and thus deny a taxpayer the opportunity 
to keep the information secret from the government.  But these systems are 
much less intrusive than if the IRS conducted a search of a taxpayer’s home 
or eavesdropped on his conversations to obtain the information. 
As a result, even though the reporting of information to the IRS 
constitutes a loss of privacy,45 it is not the type of loss that is subject to 
regulation by the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.46  Professor 
                                                          
 44. See Bernard W. Bell, Prosecuting White-Collar Crime, Theatrical Investigation:  
White Collar Crime, Undercover Operations & Privacy, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 151, 
151 (2002) (examining the privacy implications of “[t]hose who seek to ferret out white-
collar wrongdoing” by use of “assumed identities or confidential informants”); see also 
Bernard W. Bell, Wiretapping’s Fruits, the First Amendment, and the Paradigms of Privacy 
22 (Mar. 4, 2004) [hereinafter Bell, Wiretapping’s Fruits] (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the American University  Law Review) (explaining that “[s]ometimes we seek to 
protect privacy by forbidding particular means of intrusion that are especially destructive of 
privacy”), available at http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/fp/art1. 
 45. Stuntz explains that the failure of the courts to use the Fourth Amendment to 
invalidate IRS reporting requirements is not due to a lack of sensitivity of the information 
reported.  Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1032.  He gives the example of the requirement on the 
Form 1040 that an individual claiming a charitable deduction for property with a value 
exceeding $500 must provide the name of the charity recipient on the return.  Id. at 1032-33.  
He notes that “[t]his information is undoubtedly private in any ordinary sense of the word, 
and it more than exceeds the Fourth Amendment privacy threshold.  The objects of my 
charity are much more sensitive than the usual contents of my glove compartment, and the 
latter are protected against unreasonable searches.”  Id. at 1033. 
 46. See id. at 1034 (explaining that “[j]udges are not about to start invalidating 
commonplace items on tax forms on Fourth Amendment grounds.  Nor should they.  But 
explaining why not turns out to be hard, given that the system protects much weaker privacy 
interests against invasion by the police.”).  Stuntz argues that a number of possible 
explanations for this result are inadequate.  First, he rejects the argument that government 
interests are stronger, or privacy interests are weaker, in the tax context than in the criminal 
context.  Id. at 1033, 1035.  He explains that if the Tax Code were subject to judicial review 
on Fourth Amendment grounds 
[T]he government would typically have to defend not the tax code as a whole, but 
only the particular feature that caused the relevant privacy invasion.  No court 
would need to choose between privacy protection and the tax code . . . for the 
relevant tax . . . rules could always be recast to require less disclosure. 
Id. at 1035.  Further, he argues that “[w]ith respect to the mass of car searches and street 
stop-and-frisks, the informational privacy interest at stake does not seem any weightier than 
the taxpayer’s interest in keeping secret the objects of his charity.”  Id. at 1036.  He 
considers the argument that privacy is less relevant in the regulatory than in the criminal 
context because the regulatory context usually involves regulation of the conduct of 
institutions, not individuals.  Id. at 1036-38.  But he notes that the argument is inadequate 
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Sherry Colb explains that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated by 
regulatory disclosure requirements because the Fourth Amendment is 
addressed not at the “right to keep information secret from the 
government,” but at the right to “privacy from . . . governmental ‘personal 
knowledge’ of the individual=s private life.”47  By “personal knowledge” 
Colb means a person “directly perceiv[ing] a material event through the use 
of one or more of her five senses.”48  Similarly, Professor Louis Michael 
Seidman has commented that:  “Modern Fourth Amendment law focuses 
on what might be called the ‘collateral damage’ imposed by searches and 
seizures rather than on informational privacy . . . . [T]he focus is . . . on 
violence, disruption, and humiliation,” for example, in a search of a 
house.49  Moreover, he notes:  “It is one thing to fill out a form that requests 
information about even the most personal details of one’s life.  It is quite 
another to discover after the fact that someone has been observing these 
                                                                                                                                      
because it does not apply to the information-gathering on individual tax returns.  Id. at 1038.  
Stuntz also considers the argument that information-gathering by the IRS could be viewed 
as less subject to “a kind of overbreadth problem” than a search of car or house.  Id. at 1039.  
Thus, he notes “[w]hen the police search a car, they see anything that happens to be in the 
car, not just guns or drugs . . . . [But t]ax forms . . . ask only for the information the 
government needs under the tax laws, not for generalized financial disclosure.”  Id.  Yet, he 
explains that “in any across-the-board disclosure regime, most of the disclosure is about 
legitimate conduct.  A great many law-abiding taxpayers must disclose a great deal about 
their finances in order to help catch a few frauds.”  Id. at 1040.  Stuntz also considers the 
argument that when the IRS asks for information substantiating a charitable deduction this 
can be distinguished from a search in the criminal context because “if he [the taxpayer] does 
not want to share the information, he does not have to claim the deduction.”  Id.  But he 
rejects this argument because “it requires that one treat the money as belonging to the 
government, which then bestows deductions as a matter of grace on whatever conditions it 
chooses.”  Id. 
 47. Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment 
“Reasonableness,” 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1666 (1998). 
 48. Id. (explaining that “[u]nder the Fourth Amendment, the government’s obligation to 
respect individual privacy has generally amounted to a prohibition against such direct 
perception of individuals’ physical or mental states, activities, conversations, and other 
personal experiences that are manifestly hidden from observation, absent some justification 
that would qualify a proposed inspection as ‘reasonable’”). 
 49. Louis Michael Seidman, Response:  The Problems With Privacy’s Problem, 93 
MICH. L. REV. 1079, 1086-87 (1995).  He continues: 
Consider, first, the search of a house . . . . Obviously, police raids can be a 
terrifying experience for all involved, and the slightest miscalculation can result in 
serious injury or death . . . . Consider searches on the street . . . . A typical search 
requires the police to delay a suspect who is going about his business, force him to 
assume a vulnerable and uncomfortable position, embarrass him before others, and 
touch all parts of his body.  Even if the search is less intrusive . . . the suspect may 
have no way of knowing these limits while the search is progressing . . . . Wiretaps, 
visual surveillance, searches of parked cars, and the like are not violent or invasive 
in this sense.  Once again, however, it distorts analysis to analogize the damage that 
they do to the damage to informational privacy that occurs when an individual fills 
out a tax form.  The key difference is that these police investigative techniques 
typically catch people unaware.  Because they reveal things about people in 
circumstances in which they do not know that they are being spied upon, these 
techniques violate human dignity. 
Id. at 1087-90 (emphasis added). 
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personal details firsthand with a telescope aimed at one’s bedroom 
window.”50 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not 
protect a citizen from mandatory disclosure to the government, where the 
information is needed for a legitimate government purpose,51 and where the 
government has adopted adequate procedures to safeguard the 
information.52  In Whalen v. Roe,53 the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
a New York statute requiring doctors to provide information about 
prescriptions written for certain dangerous drugs to the state health 
department.54  The information, including the names of the patients, was to 
be recorded by the health department in a centralized computer file, but 
public disclosure was forbidden.55  The Supreme Court pointed out that 
government regulation necessarily entails extensive collection of personal 
information: 
The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social security 
benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of our Armed 
Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal laws all require the orderly 
preservation of great quantities of information, much of which is 
personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if 
                                                          
 50. Id. at 1090; see also Daniel Yeager, Does Privacy Really Have a Problem in the 
Law of Criminal Procedure?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1283, 1309 (1997) (arguing that the 
“self-disclosure” required on tax returns or by subpoenas involves coercion that is 
“justifiable because both entail actions by, not just against, the suspect,” that is, because of a 
“participatory element”). 
 51. Mazza notes that “[i]f the information sought by the IRS would be incriminating, 
the taxpayer may exercise his Fifth Amendment rights, but the taxpayer must assert the 
claim on a document-by-document basis . . . . Moreover, the precise scope of the Fifth 
Amendment protection against disclosure of information to the IRS is unclear . . . . In any 
case, as a means of shielding information from the IRS, a claim of self-incrimination is of 
little use to the average taxpayer simply because the taxpayer has no grounds for asserting 
the privilege.”  Mazza, supra note 4, at 1100. 
 52. See Mazza, supra note 4, at 1101 (stating that “[n]either Congress nor the courts 
recognize a generalized right of privacy as a defense against submitting information relevant 
to the determination of the taxpayer’s tax liability”). 
 53. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 54. Id. at 600 (concluding that the statute “does not, on its face, pose a sufficiently 
grievous threat to either interest to establish a constitutional violation” in light of the 
statutory and administrative procedures designed to avoid unwarranted disclosures of the 
information). 
 55. Id.  The patients and doctors argued that the statute “threatens to impair both their 
interest in the nondisclosure of private information and also their interest in making 
important decisions independently.”  Id.  The Court found that the disclosures of the 
information to health department officials were not “meaningfully distinguishable from a 
host of other unpleasant invasions of privacy that are associated with many facets of health 
care.”  Id. at 602.  It noted that “public disclosure” would occur only if health department 
employees “fail[] to maintain proper security.”  Id. at 600.  It had noted that “[p]ublic 
disclosure of the identity of the patients is expressly prohibited by statute.”  Id. at 594.  See 
Bell, Wiretapping’s Fruits, supra note 44, at 30 (noting that the Supreme Court in Whalen 
“focused on the means of intrusion, considering collection of information by itself less 
intrusive than collection and dissemination of information”). 
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disclosed.56 
Further, the Court explained that only “unwarranted disclosure of 
accumulated private data—whether intentional or unintentional” or an 
absence of adequate “security provisions” would “arguably” raise a 
constitutional issue regarding the collection of data by the government.57 
To say that there is no constitutional issue raised by the mandatory 
reporting of information to the IRS on Form 1040 or 1099 (assuming 
adequate protection against public disclosure) is not to say that such 
reporting does not have important privacy implications or that Congress 
should not take these into account in crafting the income tax laws.  
However, it does suggest that one should carefully analyze the actual harms 
that may result from the reporting of investment income before concluding 
that abolishing such reporting would bring significant privacy benefits. 
B.   Who Obtains the Information and For What Purpose Is it Used? 
Since 1976, the Code has provided that tax return information is 
“confidential” and is to be inspected or disclosed by IRS employees only in 
situations specifically authorized and under conditions designed to protect 
the information.58  Nevertheless, Congress’s enactment of these 
requirements does not necessarily ensure59 that they are fully enforced.60  
                                                          
 56. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605. 
 57. Id. at 605-06.  The Court said: 
The right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically accompanied 
by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.  
Recognizing that in some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the 
Constitution, nevertheless New York’s statutory scheme, and its implementing 
administrative procedures, evidence a proper concern with, and protection of, the 
individual’s interest in privacy.  We therefore need not, and do not, decide any 
question which might be presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated 
private data—whether intentional or unintentional—or by a system that did not 
contain  comparable security provisions. 
Id. 
 58. See I.R.C. § 6103 (2005); see also 2000 JCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 21-58 
(detailing this provision, its background, and subsequent amendments); Mazza, supra note 
4, at 1086-96. 
 59. See Peter P. Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech Government 
Surveillance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 461, 497 (1999) (stating that “a major potential problem of 
government access to financial data is that the information may flow to unauthorized third 
parties”).  He notes that unauthorized persons can seek to obtain the information through a 
“‘friendly’ insider or a bribable one.”  Id.  He also warns of the danger posed by “skilled 
hackers,” and notes that the “Defense Department reports hundreds of thousands of 
successful intrusions into military computers per year” although he concedes that “many of 
the intrusions are undoubtedly done by teenagers and others who get access to part of the 
system but do not steal any sensitive data.”  Id.  He concludes that “[t]he possibility of 
intrusions, nonetheless, is a powerful argument against allowing unlimited government 
access to sensitive personal information of any kind, including detailed financial 
information.”  Id. 
 60. See Mazza, supra note 4, at 1095 (noting that “the number of wrongful disclosure 
claims each year has been relatively few given the total number of disclosures the IRS 
makes on an annual basis”).  He notes that, according to the Joint Committee on Taxation, 
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Therefore, in analyzing the harms that might be caused by mandatory 
reporting of investment income to the IRS, it is necessary to consider both 
authorized and unauthorized uses and disclosures of information.61 
1.  Authorized use by IRS employees to determine correct amount of tax 
liability and to collect tax 
This Part will first consider whether the inspection of information about 
a taxpayer’s investment income by a law-abiding IRS employee creates any 
potential for harm to the taxpayer.  Under the current tax system, there may 
be very few employees who actually inspect this data in the vast majority 
of cases.  Increasingly,  1099 and 104062 forms are being transmitted via 
computer,63 resulting in less information being viewed by human eyes.  The 
computer may simply match the items of investment income reported on 
the Form 1040 with the items reported on Form 1099.  Even if a 
discrepancy is found, it might not require human intervention for a notice 
to be mailed to the taxpayer.  Only if the taxpayer responds with an 
explanation of the discrepancy (as compared to ignoring the notice, or 
paying the additional tax due) would an IRS employee actually view the 
information. 
An IRS employee might also scrutinize the taxpayer’s investment 
income as part of an audit, even if no discrepancy is found between a 
taxpayer’s Form 1040 and Form 1099.64  For example, an auditor might 
focus on whether the taxpayer properly computed his basis on the sale of an 
asset or whether he properly characterized his gain as capital gain.  
Alternatively, the auditor might pursue a broad inquiry into a taxpayer’s 
financial affairs because of a suspected omission of business income.  
However, under the current system, the likelihood of any particular 
individual being audited is quite low.65  Moreover, a broad audit of the 
                                                                                                                                      
“between 1994 and 1999, the Government lost 24 unauthorized disclosure cases and won 
97.”  Id. at 1095-96 n.144. 
 61. See Mazza, supra note 4, at 1098 (stating that “privacy is a multi-faceted concept, 
implicating proscriptions against intrusiveness (the extent to which the individual should be 
forced to divulge information), misuse (the extent to which protections against unauthorized 
use should exist), and unauthorized disclosure (the extent to which information should 
remain confidential)”). 
 62. See Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, Enforcement Revenue Reaches 
Record in 2004:  Prepared Remarks of IRS Commissioner Mark W. Everson (Nov. 18, 
2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) (explaining that for the 2004 tax 
year, more than half of individual taxpayers are expected to file electronically). 
 63. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 37, at 157 & n.50 (noting that “[e]ach year, the 
IRS receives one billion information reports, most of them on magnetic tape or transmitted 
electronically”). 
 64. The GAO has estimated that for 1992 taxpayers reported on their returns 97.7% of 
their true net income from interest, 92.2% for dividends, and 92.8% for capital gains.  
SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 37, at 154 tbl. 5.1. 
 65. See Dan Horn, Tax Audits Aim More At Individuals IRS Ducking Complicated 
Corporate Cases, Critics Say, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Apr. 1, 2004, at 1A (indicating that 
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financial affairs of a business person  is at least as likely under the flat tax 
as under the income tax.66 
Another situation in which the IRS might scrutinize a taxpayer’s  
investments assets is if the taxpayer fails to pay an assessed tax voluntarily 
and the IRS must find a source of payment.  This situation would occur 
under the flat tax, as well as the income tax.67 
Assuming that an IRS employee does in fact scrutinize the taxpayer’s 
investment income, is this harmful to the taxpayer? It is hard to imagine, 
unless the taxpayer is a celebrity, that an IRS employee assigned to the 
taxpayer’s case68 would take anything other than a professional interest in 
the matter, even if the amount of investment income is extremely high.  
The taxpayer should find assurance in the fact that the IRS employees with 
access to the information are strangers, anonymous bureaucrats in 
unfamiliar places, whom the taxpayers do not expect to see or deal with in 
any other role or context and who can be expected to have no particular 
interest69 in knowing any of the details of the taxpayer’s life (except to 
carry out the employee’s duties).70  In fact, IRS employees are specifically 
barred from examining a tax return “if a relationship impairs impartiality.” 
71 
                                                                                                                                      
the individual audit rate is 0.65%). 
 66. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing problems that would not 
be solved even if flat tax were implemented). 
 67. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (comparing the current collection 
process to the flat tax collection process). 
 68. See infra notes 122-125 and accompanying text (discussing “browsing” of a 
taxpayer’s records by an IRS employee not assigned to the case). 
 69. See ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31-32 (New York 1967) (describing 
“anonymity” as the “third state of privacy@ after “solitude” and “intimacy”).  The author 
explains that 
[A]nonymity . . . occurs when the individual is in public places or performing 
public acts but still seeks, and finds, freedom from identification and 
surveillance. . . . he is among people and knows that he is being observed; but 
unless he is a well-known celebrity, he does not expect to be personally identified 
and held to the full rules of behavior and role that would operate if he were known 
to those observing him. . . . the individual can express himself freely [to a stranger] 
because he knows the stranger will not continue in his life and . . . is able to exert 
no authority or restraint over the individual. 
Id. 
 70. See Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1041 (discussing the lack of necessity to consider 
privacy issues seriously in regulatory matters).  The author notes: 
One might plausibly say that telling the IRS who receives my charitable 
contributions does not really intrude on my privacy very much.  After all, my 
friends and neighbors and co-workers do not know; the only people who have the 
information are a few government employees who have no contact with me, do not 
know or care who I am, and are under strict orders not to spread the information 
around. 
Id. 
 71. The IRS’s Internal Revenue Manual states that “[a] conflict of interest exists if an 
examiner=s personal relationship(s) or private interest (usually of a financial or economic 
nature) conflict, or raise a reasonable question of conflict with the examiner’s public duties 
and responsibilities.”  INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 
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Most people can imagine that there might be some secrets about a 
taxpayer that are so sensitive that he would feel embarrassed, humiliated, or 
unhappy if any bureaucrat (however distant and anonymous) were to have 
access to them.  A secret of this type might be the fact that the taxpayer’s 
father was a serial killer or that he has a venereal disease or male breast 
cancer.72  However, no conceivable information about one’s investment 
income seems to fit into this category.  This may be because an investment, 
by its very nature, requires merely a passive involvement from the investor 
(as compared to one’s more active involvement with a business activity or 
employment).  Therefore, an investment does not relate directly to one’s 
personal identity.73 
On the other hand, one may feel that the amount of one’s personal 
wealth is an important part of one’s identity.74  Generally, only lack of 
wealth, not wealth, is viewed as humiliating or embarrassing.75  
Furthermore, it would seem very odd for Congress to eliminate taxation of 
investment income to protect the sensibilities of taxpayers who would 
otherwise have to reveal to the IRS their relative lack of wealth. 
If the taxpayer is publicly known as a savvy investor (such as Peter 
Lynch, Louis Rukeyser, or Warren Buffet), the IRS official might take 
some interest in the particular investments held by the taxpayer.  But, if the 
                                                                                                                                      
4.10.2.2.3, ¶ 1 (May 14, 1999), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/ 
part4/ch10s02.html#d0e132491. Further, it states that “[p]ersonal relationships can include 
family members, friends, and associates.”  Id. at ¶ 1A. 
 72. See, e.g., ANITA L. ALLEN, WHY PRIVACY ISN’T EVERYTHING:  FEMINIST 
REFLECTIONS ON PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 117 (2003) (discussing various reasons for 
seeking privacy regarding an individual’s health status).  Allen notes that, among other 
things, “[t]he discovery of health problems may cause anxiety and emotion.  Unfortunately, 
for some, illness leads to shame, embarrassment, and defeat that lower self-esteem and 
increase feelings of vulnerability.  Hoping to manage common forms of psychological 
distress brought on by health concerns, a person may choose secrecy.”  Id. at 118.  She also 
notes that “encounters with health providers require . . . [that] informational and physical 
privacy must be sacrificed.”  Id. at 126.  She notes that “[d]octors are not robots, but human 
beings with religious perspectives and social agendas that can openly clash with those of 
their patients.”  Id.  She concludes that “the confidentiality promise and professional manner 
of health care providers make the sacrifice tolerable, but without completely eliminating all 
of the vulnerability and low self-esteem many patients feel.”  Id. at 127. 
 73. See Linder, supra note 4, at 973-74 (stating that “[i]f the ethical, cognitive, and 
moral developmental underpinnings of personhood are made the focus of a right to privacy, 
then it becomes very difficult to apply a protective shield to such mundane material matters 
as income”). 
 74. See id. at 971 (stating that “in the United States a person’s income level plays a 
crucial part in determining ‘worth,’ that is, others’ estimation of her economic, social, and 
moral value as a human being, and in turn shapes her self-worth and self-image”).  The 
author explains that his article “challenges the underlying reality and desirability of this set 
of interlocking assumptions.”  Id. 
 75. See id. at 971 n.131 (citing The Internal Revenue Law—Telling Other People’s 
Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1864, § 1, at 4).  During the Civil War, income tax returns 
were subject to public inspection, and Marc Linder recounts that a New York Times editorial 
stated that “many people with small incomes made no tax return in order to avoid ‘sneers.’”  
Id. 
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taxpayer is famous in any other way (e.g., as a movie star), there likely 
would be little interest in the details of that taxpayer’s investments, 
although there might be some titillation value in the amount of investment 
income (as an indication of wealth).76  Assuming (for the time being) that 
the IRS employee is conscientiously carrying out his responsibilities and 
not using the information for any other purpose or disclosing it to others, it 
is hard to see a serious harm, even to the celebrity taxpayer.  Moreover, it is 
not at all clear that the tax law should be crafted with particular concern for 
the financial privacy of celebrities. 
In conclusion, unless a taxpayer is seeking to avoid tax liability with 
respect to investment income, the mere fact that IRS employees may be 
reviewing information about the taxpayer’s investment income as shown on 
a 1040 or 1099 form does not in itself represent a serious harm.77 
2.  Unauthorized uses by IRS employees or others 
It is, of course, possible that IRS employees will inspect or disclose data 
without proper authorization, either because they are corrupt or negligent, 
or because the IRS culture does not put sufficient emphasis on 
confidentiality.78  Breaches of confidentiality may also occur when 
information is in the hands of persons outside of the IRS to whom 
disclosure was authorized.79 Furthermore, it is conceivable that persons not 
employed by the IRS will gain unauthorized access to IRS data due to 
                                                          
 76. One would expect that the IRS employee would be more interested in the 
celebrity’s family situation (e.g., whether one spouse was disclaiming knowledge of 
underreporting by the other spouse or how many months an ex-spouse lived in the house). 
 77. In a number of cases addressing the constitutionality of mandatory financial 
disclosure for public officials, the courts have stressed the much greater intrusion of public 
disclosure as opposed to disclosure merely to government officials.  See, e.g., Barry v. City 
of N.Y., 712 F.2d 1554, 1565 (2d Cir. 1983) (upholding a law requiring that various city 
officials file annual information reports with the City Clerk and providing for public 
inspection).  The court noted that “the degree of intrusion stemming from public exposure of 
the details of a person’s life is exponentially greater than exposure to government officials.”  
Id. at 1561 (quoting Slevin v. City of N.Y., 551 F. Supp. 917, 934 (D.C.N.Y. 1982)). 
 78. See Mazza, supra note 4, at 1102 (noting that “[w]ith so much taxpayer information 
at the IRS’s disposal, individualized cases of misuse and inadvertent leakage of tax return 
information outside the agency seem inevitable”). 
 79. See Memorandum from Gordon C. Milbourn, III, Acting Deputy Inspector General 
for Audit, Dep’t. of Treasury, to Internal Revenue Service (Dec. 19, 2002), in DEP’T. OF 
TREASURY, IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO PREVENT THE POTENTIAL DISCLOSURE OF 
CONFIDENTIAL TAXPAYER INFORMATION (2002) [hereinafter IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED] 
(concluding that “the IRS . . . has established procedures to help ensure third parties, such as 
government agencies and private contractors, [receiving tax information from the IRS] 
safeguard taxpayer information,” and “the IRS conducts on-site safeguard reviews of the 
agencies receiving taxpayer information every 3 years, as required”).  Milbourn notes that 
“a review of the IRS’ disclosure procedures and a judgmental sample of IRS agreements 
with federal and state agencies and private contractors . . . indicated that the IRS needs to 
make improvements to its safeguard processes and procedures.”  Id. at 10.  One of the 
specific conclusions of the report was that “[t]he IRS does not have adequate staffing to 
effectively implement all the safeguard procedures required by I.R.C. section 6103” in that 
“[t]he IRS’ Headquarters Safeguard Office has a staff of 8 employees.”  Id. 
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inadequate security of the IRS offices or computers. 
What are the potential consequences of these unauthorized acts for 
taxpayers and what is the likelihood of these consequences occurring?80 
a.  Use to perpetrate theft of assets, credit, or investment strategy 
Theft of one’s property is obviously a serious harm from which 
individuals universally desire protection.  Therefore, it is important to 
consider whether information obtained by the IRS about a taxpayer’s 
investments creates significant opportunities for theft.81  Under the current 
income tax, the IRS has information about each of the taxpayer’s financial 
or securities accounts, as well as the account numbers.  This information, 
though, is not sufficient to permit a criminal to withdraw funds from an 
account.  The criminal would also need the taxpayer’s passwords, which 
the IRS would not possess.  Thus, even assuming that IRS data falls into 
the hands of a corrupt employee, or a criminal hacking into its computer 
system, a taxpayer’s accounts should be safe. 
On the other hand, information about a taxpayer’s financial accounts, 
even without the passwords, might be valuable to a creditor who is unable 
to track down a taxpayer’s assets.  With this information, the creditor could 
use legal proceedings to seize the assets.  Therefore, it is possible that a 
corrupt IRS employee or a computer hacker could seek to profit by selling 
this information to creditors.  The likelihood of this actually occurring is 
slim, though, because (1) assets hidden from creditors are often hidden 
from the IRS and (2) the assets might be held in such a form (e.g., in an 
asset protection trust) that creditors would not be able to use the legal 
system to seize them.  If a creditor was actually able to utilize the 
information collected by the IRS to obtain payment of debt, the only harm 
would be that the IRS had not lived up to its obligation to protect the 
                                                          
 80. It is dangerous to use anecdotal evidence for this purpose.  See Leandra Lederman, 
Of Taxpayer Rights, Wrongs, and a Proposed Remedy, 87 TAX NOTES 1133, 1133, 1136 
(2000) (noting that “[t]wo of the existing taxpayer bills of rights were prompted by 
anecdotal evidence of Internal Revenue Service ‘horror stories,’” and urging “caution” with 
respect to “wholesale acceptance of taxpayer horror stories”).  Lederman notes that many 
elements of a story told about an IRS raid by John Colaprete at Senate hearings were later 
corrected.  Id. at 1136.  Lederman explains that a 1999 report of the General Accounting 
Office “failed to substantiate various allegations of taxpayer abuse and IRS employee 
misconduct.”  Id. 
 81. See SISSELA BOK, SECRETS:  ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 24 
(1989) (explaining that “secrecy is invoked to protect what one owns.  We take for granted 
the legitimacy of hiding silver from burglars and personal documents from snoopers and 
busybodies . . . [H]ad we no belongings whatsoever, our identity and our capacity to plan 
would be threatened”); see also Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 
393, 400-01 (1978) (explaining that people “conceal an unexpectedly high income in order 
(1) to avoid the attention of tax collectors, kidnappers, and thieves, (2) to fend off 
solicitations from charities and family members, and (3) to preserve a reputation for 
generosity that might be demolished if others knew the precise fraction of their income that 
they give away”). 
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confidentiality of tax return information;82 the fact that the taxpayer was 
required to repay a debt that he was already obligated to pay is not in itself 
harmful from the societal perspective. 
Collection of investment information by the IRS under the income tax 
does not increase the likelihood of identity theft.  Identity theft occurs when 
a criminal steals information that an individual uses as identification for 
financial purposes (e.g., his name, address, Social Security number, 
mother’s maiden name), and uses it to obtain credit in the individual’s 
name.83  The same type of identifying information used by the IRS under 
the income tax (name, address and Social Security number) would also be 
used by the IRS under the flat tax.  Therefore, there is no greater protection 
from identity theft under the flat tax.  Moreover, there is no reason to 
believe that under the current tax system, the IRS has been an important 
source of that information for those perpetrating identity theft.84 
                                                          
 82. This might have implications for a taxpayer’s willingness to voluntarily provide 
information to the IRS.  See 2000 JCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 5 (stating that the policy of 
confidentiality in section 6103 “is based on persons’ right to privacy, as well as the view 
that voluntary compliance will be increased if taxpayers know that the information they 
provide to the government will not become public”); see also id. at 128 (stating that 
“[p]rivacy advocates argue that a taxpayer is more willing to comply with the tax laws if he 
or she knows the information will be treated as confidential”).  But cf. Mazza, supra note 4, 
at 1070-73 (arguing that there is little direct evidence linking confidentiality and 
compliance). 
 83. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 
80 TEX. L. REV. 89 (2001) (discussing  identity theft); see also 2000 JCT REPORT, supra 
note 3, at 128 (stating that if tax return information “were publicly available . . . [t]he 
available information, which could include names, addresses, social security numbers and 
financial holdings, could be used to establish credit fraudulently and run up debts in the 
taxpayer’s name”) (citing GREGORY D. KUTZ, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE:  RESULTS OF FISCAL YEAR 1998 FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT 8, 11 
(1999); Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, IRS Updates the ‘Dirty Dozen’ for 2003:  
Agency Warns of 12 Common Scams (Feb. 19, 2003) (on file with the American University 
Law Review) (warning taxpayers that tax return preparers may use information such as 
Social Security numbers and financial information to commit identity theft)). 
 84. See, e.g., SYNOVATE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION—IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY 
REPORT (Sept. 2003) (not mentioning IRS in particular as a source of personal information 
for identity thieves), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/synova 
tereport.pdf.  This survey found that thirty-four percent of those victims whose personal 
information had been misused to open new credit accounts or take out new loans were 
aware of the thief’s identity; fifty-two percent of those who knew the thief’s identity 
identified a family member or relative as the perpetrator, while thirteen percent identified 
the perpetrator as an employee or a company or financial institution that had access to the 
victim’s personal information.  Id.; see also Identity Theft:  How It Happens, Its Impact on 
Victims, and Legislative Solutions:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Technology, 
Terrorism, and Government Information of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 
(2000) (written testimony of Beth Givens, Director, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) 
(discussing various “methods used by identity thieves to obtain identifying information 
about their victims” but not mentioning leakage from IRS files), available at 
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/id_theft.htm.  Recently a guilty plea was obtained in one of 
the most alarming cases of identity theft in U.S. history in terms of the number of victims 
(approximately 30,000), and the extent of their losses, which exceeded $50 million.  Julia 
Preston, Man Admits Role in Ring That Stole Credit Identities, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2004, 
at B7.  The person pleading guilty had been employed by Teledata Communications, which 
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Information held by the IRS about a taxpayer’s investments may be 
considered valuable when it reveals the taxpayer’s investment insights and 
strategies.  A corrupt IRS employee or computer hacker might somehow 
seek to take advantage of this information in making personal 
investments,85 but this does not seem to be a serious concern.  Much of this 
information is already freely available as the SEC requires disclosure by 
investors buying more than five percent of a company.86  More importantly, 
the wisdom of using this type of information is highly questionable, as 
illustrated by a recent case where many small investors lost large amounts 
after buying a stock that had been known to be purchased by Peter Lynch.87 
b.  Use for targeting the wealthy 
Under the current system, the IRS has access to more information about 
the wealth of each taxpayer than under a flat tax.88  If the fact that a 
taxpayer is particularly wealthy falls into the hands of criminals (either 
through a corrupt IRS employee or other leakage of the information), this 
might result in the individual becoming a target for certain crimes.  For 
example, criminals could use the information to target wealthy individuals 
for kidnapping89 with a view towards collecting ransom.90  However, while 
                                                                                                                                      
provides services to connect businesses to large credit bureaus via computer.  Id.  The 
employee had access to confidential access codes that enabled him to review the financial 
records of credit bureaus, “including bank accounts, credit cards and loans.”  Id. 
 85. See, e.g., Swire, supra note 59, at 493.  Peter Swire, former Chief Counselor for 
Privacy in the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, suggests the following possibilities:  
“Access to detailed financial records might reveal confidential business information or 
otherwise give officials an advantage in choosing their own investments.”  Id.  Swire notes 
that “officials might benefit financially by sharing data with outside parties, who might pay 
an official for the data and then use the data for their own purposes.”  Id. at 494.  He also 
points out that “[s]haring data with outside parties might also open up investments for 
officials that they could not otherwise afford.  For instance, if confidential data revealed that 
a piece of expensive property would soon rise in value, then an official might join up with 
other ‘investors’ to purchase the property.”  Id. 
 86. See Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (West 2002) (detailing the 
information reporting required of persons who acquire over five percent of certain classes of 
securities). 
 87. See Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Hard Lesson:  Copying Peter Lynch, Investors Bought a 
Stock, Watched It Tank; Fund Star Reported a Stake in Tiny Firm, Which SEC Now Calls 
Fraud-Ridden, Big Buys Get Chance to Recoup, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2004, at 1A (noting  
that “[t]he case shows how badly things can go wrong as small investors try to ape the 
moves of celebrity stock-pickers”). 
 88. See infra note 152 and accompanying text (suggesting that if the government has 
less information about an individual, as it would under a flat tax, there is less risk of the 
government mishandling that information). 
 89. In the 1930s, when Congress adopted and then immediately repealed the so-called 
pink slip system for disclosing tax return information to the public, opponents argued that it 
would contribute to kidnapping.  See Mazza, supra note 4, at 1089 (pointing out that 
opponents of the so-called “pink slip” tax disclosure provision in the Revenue Act of 1934 
“warned that releasing the information to the public would facilitate blackmail, kidnapping, 
and related crimes”); see also 2000 JCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 254 (noting that public 
opposition to the “pink slip” provision was partially driven by the view that “the slips would 
only be of use to a person’s competitors, the ‘malicious and idle curious,’ kidnappers, and 
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kidnapping is epidemic in some countries,91 kidnapping for ransom has not 
been a significant problem in the United States.92  Moreover, there seem to 
be many easier ways to discover wealthy targets for kidnapping, such as 
SEC documents published online, the Forbes 500 list, and newspaper 
business pages. 
Information that an individual is wealthy could also be leaked to those 
making commercial solicitations, such as purveyors of luxury goods or 
investment managers.  Furthermore, the information could be used by 
charities or political organizations in an effort to find people capable of 
making large donations.  Even if the solicitations were legitimate, they 
could constitute a nuisance for the individual.  Moreover, some of these 
solicitations could be made by scam artists, rather than by legitimate 
businesses or charities.  Some of the individuals targeted might not 
otherwise be easily identifiable as wealthy because of their modest life 
style.93 
                                                                                                                                      
blackmailers”); OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 
ON SCOPE AND USE OF TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS 19 (Oct. 
2000) [hereinafter 2000 TREASURY REPORT] (stating that repeal of the pink slip provision 
was “[f]ueled by images of kidnappers sifting through pink slips looking for worthwhile 
victims”), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/confide.pdf. 
 90. Cf. MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 15 (asserting that financial privacy makes it more 
difficult for criminals to select potential victims).  Mitchell further notes that “[m]any 
citizens, particularly those from the developing world, want confidentiality so they are less 
likely to be targeted for kidnapping and other violent crimes.”  Id. 
 91. See Fear of Captivity, THE ECONOMIST, June 19, 2004, at 54 (citing a New York 
security consultant’s estimate that in 2003 there were approximately 4,000 kidnappings in 
Colombia, 3,000 in Mexico and 2,000 in Argentina, and expressing skepticism that lower 
figures provided by government bodies are correct); V. Groginsky, Crime as Threat; The 
Rising Tide of Latin Crime Reaches the Level of a Regional Security Threat, DEF. & 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS’ STRATEGIC POLICY, Jan. 2004, at 4 (noting that Colombia leads the world 
in kidnappings, much of it commercially-motivated and perpetrated by guerilla and para-
military groups, and criminal gangs); Niko Price, A New Type of Kidnapper Terrorizes Latin 
America; Brutal Crime Wave Overwhelms Region, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2004, at A20, 
(noting that according to a business risk consultancy, Latin America accounts for seventy-
five percent of all kidnappings in the world); Niko Price, Spotlight on Kidnap and Ransom, 
INT’L MONEY MKTG., Sept. 9, 2004, at 32 (stating that commercial kidnapping is a 
“significant threat in Latin America, the Asia Pacific region, the former Soviet Union, 
Africa, the Middle East, India, Pakistan and Eastern Europe”); Melanie Simpson-Mills, 
Welcome To Mexico City—The New Kidnap Capital of the World, INDEP. (London), Sept. 5, 
2004, at 19 [hereinafter Welcome to Mexico City] (noting that in Mexico City, each day an 
average of four people are kidnapped and approximately seventy people are victims of 
“express kidnappings,” in which victims are driven to an ATM and forced to withdraw cash 
before they are released). 
 92. See Halcyon Ellis, Vanishing Point, WASH. POST MAG., May 6, 2004, at 10 
(analyzing the kidnap and ransom insurance market and noting that compared to other 
“global hotspots” for kidnappings, the several kidnap and ransom cases in the United States 
usually result in the rapid arrest of kidnappers, thanks to the high quality of domestic law 
enforcement).  In contrast, in a kidnapping hotspot such as Mexico City, “police corruption 
is not just a matter of taking bribes to turn a blind eye but of policemen who are active 
kidnappers.” Simpson-Mills, supra note 91, at 18. 
 93. See THOMAS J. STANLEY & WILLIAM D. DANKO, THE MILLIONAIRE NEXT DOOR 7 
(1996) (asserting that “most people who are not wealthy . . . think millionaires own 
expensive clothes, watches, and other status artifacts.  We have found this is not the case”). 
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Again, it is by no means clear that a leak, or other unauthorized 
disclosure, from the IRS is a common means for businesses or other 
organizations to identify wealthy targets for their legal or illegal 
solicitations.  In many cases, data about one’s financial accounts is more 
easily available as a result of leakage from databases of financial 
institutions.94 
c.  Use of information to exercise government power against political 
enemies and other disfavored groups 
Professor Peter Swire offers the example of “Nazi insistence in the 1930s 
that Jews give detailed reports of their financial assets” to show “how 
personal data can be used to discriminate against individuals and groups.”95  
He explains that “the Nazis then used these reports as part of a systematic 
program to seize Jewish assets.”96  This example may lead one to wonder 
whether the IRS’s collection of information about a taxpayer=s investments 
may facilitate the IRS’s illegal seizure of the taxpayer’s assets for corrupt 
purposes or to harass a political enemy.  However, there is little evidence 
that the IRS has engaged in patently illegal seizures of assets (based on 
concocted tax liabilities).  If such an IRS action did occur, the taxpayer 
should be able to obtain judicial review.  If the judiciary refused to 
invalidate the action or if judicial orders were ignored by the agency, it 
                                                          
 94. See, e.g., Bruce Mohl, Forget Your Bank Balance? It’s Available On the Internet, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 4, 2004, at D1 (reporting how I.C.U., an online asset search firm, was 
able to determine, with only minor mistakes, the bank, checking account number and current 
balance of Eric F. Bourassa, a privacy advocate who had authorized the search).  Bourassa 
discussed three ways in which the information may have leaked out:  (1) I.C.U. called the 
bank and illegally impersonated him; (2) the bank sold or shared his information with 
I.C.U.; or (3) the bank shared the information with a third party, which then released it to 
I.C.U.  Id.  According to the Boston Globe, I.C.U. claimed that it “complies with the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which prohibits the use of false pretenses to obtain consumers= 
personal financial information,” and that “there are a number of legal ways to get the same 
information, including going through a subject’s trash to obtain bank and brokerage 
statements[,] spying on a subject to get a bank account or debit card number, obtaining the 
subject’s credit report, or culling bank account information from credit applications filed 
with auto dealerships or department stores.”  Id.; see also George Guttman, The 
Confidentiality Statute Needs Rethinking, 86 TAX NOTES 318, 322 (2000) (noting that 
“[m]ore and more of the income data reported on tax returns is becoming available 
commercially in the new information age”); Winnie Hu, Chase Bank Agrees to Stop Sharing 
Data; A Pledge of Protection for Consumer Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2000, at B1 
(describing how Chase Bank allegedly violated its own privacy policy by sharing financial 
information about eighteen million customers with four marketing companies in return for a 
commission on sales of those companies’ products); Robert O’Harrow, Jr., For Sale on the 
Web:  Your Financial Secrets; Bank Accounts Vulnerable to Data Brokers, WASH. POST, 
June 11, 1998, at A1 (describing how information brokers often keep calling banks and 
posing as customers until someone provides them with the information they are requesting). 
 95. Swire, supra note 59, at 495. 
 96. Id.  Professor Swire further suggests that “more subtly, officials might use control 
over detailed financial information to favor or disfavor groups in the release of sensitive 
political data, the administration of regulatory programs, the award of government contracts, 
or otherwise.”  Id. 
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would be a sign that our system of government was no longer 
functioning.97  It would not seem practical to craft our income tax system 
with a view to warding off dangers that might occur under such extreme 
circumstances.98 
There are other ways that the IRS’s control over information relating to 
the taxpayer could be misused for political purposes.99  One of the articles 
of impeachment against President Nixon in 1974 contained the allegation 
that Nixon “endeavored to obtain from the [IRS] . . . confidential 
information contained in income tax returns for purposes not authorized by 
law, and to cause . . . income tax audits and other income tax investigations 
to be initiated or conducted in a discriminatory manner.”100  One concern is 
that the IRS (perhaps under the direction of the White House) could leak 
information about the taxpayer to the press or to the public in such a way as 
to embarrass or discredit a political enemy of the administration.101 In 
another scenario, the IRS or the White House could intimidate the taxpayer 
                                                          
 97. A contrary example is the internment of thousands of Japanese Americans by the 
U.S. government during World War II.  The government used data provided by the U.S. 
Census Bureau to help locate Japanese Americans for this purpose.  See William Seltzer & 
Margo Anderson, The Dark Side of Numbers:  The Role of Population Data Systems in 
Human Rights Abuses, 68 SOC. RES. 481, 492 (2001) (stating that there is a general 
agreement that the Census Bureau’s “provision of mesodata and professional expertise 
violated the spirit . . . [of] the census confidentiality laws” and noting that the Census 
Bureau has denied that it released microdata about Japanese Americans during World War 
II); see also PRIVACILLA.ORG, ASSESSING THREATS TO PRIVACY:  THE GOVERNMENT 
SECTOR—GREATEST MENACE TO PRIVACY BY FAR, at 
http://www.privacilla.org/releases/Threats_to_Privacy.pdf (Sept. 2000) (on file with the 
American University Law Review).  Although the U.S. Supreme Court failed to invalidate 
the government’s actions during the World War II period, Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214, 217-28 (1944), most people have not concluded that this is a strong reason for the 
Census Bureau to discontinue its collection of data about ethnic origin.  See, e.g., Seltzer & 
Anderson, supra, at 507 (noting that numbers themselves are “morally neutral” and that it is 
what we do with numbers and data that must be monitored). 
 98. But cf. Swire, supra note 59, at 507 (stating that “[i]n our most pessimistic 
moments, we might even contemplate how tracking of all financial transactions, perhaps 
combined with other forms of high-tech surveillance, might contribute to an increased risk 
of tyranny in our society”). 
 99. Professor Swire explains the dangers as follows: 
The patterns of misuse for political gain track those for financial gain.  First, the 
officials might use the data in their political dealings.  The data may be an 
inexpensive and effective form of opposition research, and give officials inside 
information to make them more effective in achieving their political goals.  Second, 
officials might use the inside information to extract concessions from the targets of 
surveillance, the way that J. Edgar Hoover apparently used secret files to protect 
his tenure in office and to influence policy debates.  Third, officials might benefit 
politically by sharing the data with friendly outside parties.  In wiretap scandals 
involving the Los Angeles police in the early 1980s, the police allegedly leaked 
confidential data to allies in right-wing political groups. 
Id. at 494. 
 100. IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON[,] PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. 
DOC. NO. 93-339, at 3 (1974). 
 101. See infra note 103 and accompanying text (providing examples of executive branch 
officials revealing confidential tax information about political enemies to allies or the news 
media in order to gain political advantage). 
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by threatening to disclose this information without actually doing so.  In the 
past, tax return information has been obtained by the White House102 and 
leaks have occurred.103  However, after Watergate, Congress enacted 
greater restrictions on White House access to tax return information104 and 
                                                          
 102. See REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,  S. DOC. NO. 94-266, at 968-
71 (1975) (describing  requests for tax data by the White House beginning in the 1950s).  
The Senate report provides a summary of specific instances, uncovered from Watergate-
related testimony, in which tax information was provided to the White House.  Id. at 1119 
n.566; see also 2000 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 89, at 21 (stating that “[t]he Watergate 
Committee’s hearings revealed that former White House counsel John Dean had sought 
political information on so-called “enemies” from the IRS [and] the White House actually 
was supplied information on IRS investigations of Howard Hughes and Charles Rebozo.  
The Committee noted that tax information and income tax audits were commonly requested 
by White House staff and supplied by IRS personnel”). 
 103. See John Berlau, JFK Used Audits to Silence his Critics, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, 
Sept. 29, 2003, at 21 (noting an admission by Ben Bradlee of the Washington Post that 
President Kennedy had shared tax return information about billionaires J. Paul Getty and 
H.L. Hunt with him).  In 1970, H.R. Haldeman, White House Chief of Staff for President 
Nixon, leaked to a news columnist a confidential IRS report indicating that it was 
investigating George Wallace and his brother.  DAVID BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF:  
POWER, POLITICS, AND THE IRS 250 (1989).  The columnist published the information 
several weeks before Wallace was to run in an Alabama gubernatorial primary.  Id.  
Burnham also describes how a mid-level IRS official suggested to a Life magazine reporter 
in 1968 that he investigate the association between Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas and 
his former client, Wolfson.  Id. at 247-48.  The reporter’s work revealed that Fortas, while a 
Supreme Court Justice, had received a $20,000 fee from the Wolfson Foundation, at a time 
when Wolfson was appealing a securities law conviction in a U.S. court of appeals.  Id. at 
248.  It is not clear exactly what motivated the IRS official to leak this information but it 
resulted in Fortas’ resignation and gave Nixon an opportunity to alter the Supreme Court’s 
makeup.  Id. at 248-49.  Burnham also describes how John Ehrlichman, a Nixon White 
House official, requested that the IRS conduct an interview of Lawrence O’Brien, then 
chairman of the Democratic National Committee, in 1972.  Id. at 250.  The IRS conducted 
the interview in violation of its own policy regarding the questioning of political figures in 
an election year, but it concluded that no further investigation was necessary.  Id. at 250-51.  
Ehrlichman then attempted to leak to the press a claim that O’Brien had unreported income.  
Id. at 251.  For additional details about this incident, see Lawrence F. O’Brien III, Burnham 
Omitted Nixon Incident on IRS Tampering, 46 TAX NOTES 1198, 1198 (1990).  O’Brien’s 
son explains that Burnham’s book did not mention a memo written by Nixon to H.R. 
Haldeman which instructed Haldeman to personally push the highest-level IRS officials to 
conduct an audit of O’Brien for political purposes.  Id.  Finally, Burnham describes how 
some IRS officials leaked information to Bob Woodward in 1975, accusing Senator Joseph 
Montoya of having used his role as the chairman of a Senate subcommittee that set the 
IRS’s funding to influence IRS Commissioner Alexander to stop an IRS investigation of 
Senator Montoya.  BURNHAM, supra, at 300-02.  Although it was unclear whether the leak 
was made in an effort to harm Senator Montoya or Commissioner Alexander, in fact, 
Senator Montoya lost his bid for re-election one year later.  Id. at 302. 
 104. See 2000 JCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 127 (noting that prior to 1976, “executive 
orders and regulations approved by the President controlled access to” information on 
income tax returns).  In response to the abuses of Watergate, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 
eliminated “the President’s ability to control the dissemination of returns and return 
information” by amending section 6103 to make “returns and return information 
confidential, only to be disclosed as authorized by statute.”  Id. at 127-28.  Section 6103 of 
the Internal Revenue Code requires that requests by the White House for taxpayer 
information must be signed by the president personally and requires the president to make a 
quarterly report to the Joint Committee on Taxation regarding any returns that the president 
requested and the reasons for reviewing those returns.  I.R.C. § 6103(g)(1), (5) (West 2002).  
Mazza notes that this provision guards against “politically motivated misuse of return 
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unauthorized disclosures.105  Moreover, any such leaks would not 
necessarily pertain to a taxpayer’s investment assets.  For example, the IRS 
might leak information about a taxpayer’s failure to pay or to report his 
taxes accurately or about the ensuing investigation.106  The IRS might also 
leak information about a taxpayer’s consulting fees, business-related 
activities, or dependents.  Therefore, the opportunity for abuse would not 
be significantly different under the flat tax. 
Another type of abuse of power occurs when the IRS exercises its 
discretion to decide which returns to audit, what cases to pursue, and how 
rigorously to pursue them, based on political considerations.107  Political 
allies might be protected from scrutiny,108 while political enemies might be 
                                                                                                                                      
information” and severely limits the president’s ability to access tax return information.  
Mazza, supra note 4, at 1094. 
 105. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 provided that willful unauthorized disclosure could be 
punishable as a felony by a maximum fine of $5,000 and a maximum prison sentence of five 
years.  Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7213(a) (West 
2002)).  Additionally, an officer or employee of the United States convicted of such offense 
“shall be dismissed from office.”  Id. (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7213(a)(1) (West 
2002)).  In contrast, the prior version of section 7213 treated such disclosure as a 
misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum fine of $1,000 and a maximum prison sentence of 
one year.  I.R.C. § 7213(a) (1970), amended by Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7213(a)).  In addition, Congress has 
authorized taxpayers to bring civil actions for damages against the United States if an officer 
or employee of the United States made an unauthorized disclosure about an individual 
taxpayer knowingly or negligently.  I.R.C. § 7431(a)(1) (West 2002).  Section 7431 
authorizes damages of the greater of $1,000 for each act of unauthorized disclosure or the 
sum of actual damages plus punitive damages (which can be awarded in cases of willful 
disclosure or gross negligence).  I.R.C. § 7431(c) (West 2002). 
 106. See supra note 103 (discussing leaks of IRS information about political figures 
George Wallace, Senator Joseph Montoya, and Lawrence O’Brien). 
 107. See George Lardner, Jr., Nixon Sought ‘Ruthless’ Chief to ‘Do What He’s Told’ at 
IRS; Tape Includes Mention of Pursuing Enemies, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1997, at A1 
(describing how John Dean, the White House counsel under President Nixon, had requested 
that newly-appointed IRS Commissioner Walters audit taxpayers on Nixon’s “enemies 
list”).  Nixon had complained that there had been a probing audit of his own tax return in 
1963, initiated by the Kennedy Administration.  Id.  According to the Washington Post, 
Commissioner Johnnie Walters, with the backing of Treasury Secretary George P. Shultz, 
refused the request transmitted by Dean and later handed over the “enemies list” to 
congressional investigators.  Id.; see also BURNHAM, supra note 103, at 300-01 (reporting 
that in December 1972, after Senator Joseph Montoya of New Mexico had announced 
hearings to air citizens’ complaints against the IRS, the director of the IRS district in New 
Mexico began an investigation of the Senator’s tax files); Mazza, supra note 4, at 1094 
n.137 (noting that “[c]laims that the executive branch caused the IRS to initiate politically 
motivated audits resurfaced in the wake of President Clinton’s impeachment”) (citing 
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Rossotti, 317 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2003)); supra note 103 (discussing 
the subsequent investigation of Senator Montoya).  Congress has prohibited the executive 
branch from asking that the IRS initiate or terminate an investigation.  I.R.C. § 7217 (West 
2002) (prohibiting the President, Vice President, and certain executive branch employees 
from directly or indirectly requesting that the IRS “conduct or terminate an audit or other 
investigation of any particular taxpayer with respect to the tax liability of such taxpayer”). 
 108. David Burnham describes how former President Eisenhower intervened in the 
1960s with Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson to prevent the Justice 
Department’s prosecution of Sherman Adams, a former White House Chief of Staff under 
Eisenhower.  See BURNHAM, supra note 103, at 246-47.  Burnham explains that Kennedy 
and Johnson “sought psychological advantage over a former president by persuading the 
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subjected to greater than usual scrutiny.109  These political allies might end 
up paying less tax than owed and be free from the annoyance of audits; 
political enemies might end up undergoing a detailed, intrusive audit and 
having to pay every penny of tax that they owe (even while knowing that 
most taxpayers do not).  Conceivably, a political enemy could end up 
paying even more than he actually owes, after deciding that it is too 
embarrassing or politically damaging to bring the matter to Tax Court, an 
institution which publicly disseminates opinions.110  When the IRS brings a 
criminal case against a taxpayer based on political motives, even if the 
charges are not sustained in court, the taxpayer is put through a terrible and 
expensive ordeal.111 
In 1998, Congress adopted an explicit “prohibition on executive branch 
influence over taxpayer audits and other investigations.” It prescribed 
criminal penalties for White House officials willfully making improper 
requests to the IRS and for IRS employees failing to report improper 
requests to the Treasury Inspector General.112  Such legislation will not 
necessarily eliminate this abuse under the income tax.  However, if such 
political abuses are a concern under the income tax, it is hard to see that 
such concern would disappear under the flat tax.  Individuals would still be 
required to file personal tax returns showing wages and pension payments, 
and, if engaged in business, a business tax return.  (Non-profits would also 
                                                                                                                                      
IRS not to prosecute [Eisenhower’s] former assistant.”  Id. 
 109. See supra notes 103, 107 (providing relatively recent examples of executive branch 
officials using the IRS to exert political pressure on political enemies).  Burnham recounts 
how Eleanor Roosevelt sent a note to Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau suggesting an 
investigation of whether Cornell University improperly provided funds to conservative 
newspaper publisher Frank Gannett, who was also the vice chairman of the Republican 
National Committee.  BURNHAM, supra note 103, at 236-38.  Because Gannett was also the 
chairman of the executive committee of the Board of trustees of Cornell, this allegation was 
pertinent to Cornell’s tax exemption.  Id.  The subsequent investigation did not result in any 
IRS challenge to Cornell’s tax exemption.  Id.  Burnham describes another occasion, in 
which Morgenthau demanded that the IRS criminal division bring criminal tax charges 
against Andrew Mellon, a former Republican secretary of the treasury.  Id. at 229-30.  The 
government alleged that Mellon owed over a million dollars in additional taxes as a result of 
claiming illegitimate stock losses.  Id. at 230.  The grand jury, however, did not indict him, 
and in a subsequent civil case, most of the IRS claims were rejected.  Id.  Morgenthau also 
ordered an investigation of Huey Long and his associates; however, this investigation “los[t] 
momentum” with Long’s assassination.  Id. at 234. 
 110. On the other hand, the taxpayer may wish to bring to public attention the political 
motivation for the IRS action. 
 111. See BURNHAM, supra note 103, at 240-43 (describing the prosecution on criminal 
tax evasion charges of Reuben G. Lenske, a lawyer suspected by local law enforcement 
officials of being “politically suspicious”).  Lenske’s conviction was overturned by the court 
of appeals, and one of the appellate judges wrote a separate opinion referring to the 
prosecution as “a witch-hunt, a crusade by the key agent of the United States in this 
prosecution, to rid our country of unorthodox thinkers . . . by using federal income tax 
laws.”  Id. at 241.  A total of four years passed between the original indictment and Lenske’s 
acquittal.  Id. at 240. 
 112. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
206, § 1105(a), 112 Stat. 685, 711 (1998) (adding I.R.C. § 7217). 
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continue to have dealings with the IRS,113 and these could potentially be 
politically influenced).114  In all, there would continue to be a great deal of 
room for the IRS to exercise discretion with respect to auditing returns or 
pursuing deficiencies or criminal investigations, and this discretion could 
still be exercised for political reasons. 
d.  Use of information by someone already familiar with taxpayer 
People who have some familiarity with the taxpayer (either through 
direct dealings with the taxpayer or because the taxpayer is well-known) 
may be interested in the financial information that the taxpayer provided to 
the IRS.  They may seek this information in order to make decisions 
regarding their dealings with the taxpayer, in an effort to formulate an 
opinion of the taxpayer, or out of pure curiosity.  Because of the power of 
computers and database search capabilities,115 IRS employees may be in a 
position to search for information about particular individuals in whom 
they have an interest.  Moreover, with the cooperation of corrupt IRS 
employees or if computer security is not adequate, people outside the IRS 
could also browse IRS databases for information about particular 
                                                          
 113. Under the Hall-Rabushka proposal, nonprofit organizations would be exempt from 
the business tax, except with respect to income from an actual business.  See HALL & 
RABUSHKA, supra note 9, at 126.  Presumably, such organizations would still need to meet 
IRS requirements to obtain and maintain exempt status, as under current law.  For the 
treatment of nonprofits under other proposals, see Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform—
Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 TENN. L. REV. 687, 743 (1999).  Brody notes that 
The Armey-Shelby Flat Tax proposal would exempt governments and nonprofits 
from the business tax, except for their unrelated business activities.  However, the 
Flat Tax would limit the nonprofit exemption to charities, while imposing business 
taxes on transfers of property or the provision of services by all other nonprofits, 
“even if such activities are substantially related to what historically has been 
considered to be the exempt purposes of these organizations.” 
Id. at 743 (footnotes omitted). 
 114. See BURNHAM, supra note 103, at 259-60 (describing how the IRS questioned the 
exempt status of the North American Congress on Latin America, an organization that 
frequently criticized the Reagan administration’s policies); see also id. at 261 (discussing 
the IRS Commissioner’s decision in 1948 to withdraw tax exemptions for certain small 
organizations considered to be “subversive,” such as the National Council of American-
Soviet Friendship).  Burnham also describes the IRS’s investigation of the National Council 
of Churches during the Johnson and Nixon administrations.  Id. at 264-67.  Burnham argues 
that the investigation was triggered by the IRS’s opposition to the Council’s liberal views on 
race, rather than tax law concerns.  Id. at 267; see also id. at 270-73 (describing the 
Kennedy administration’s push for IRS investigations of “extremist organizations,” 
particularly Kennedy’s right-wing political enemies, as a result of which the IRS 
recommended revocation of the exempt status of H.L. Hunt’s Life-Line Foundation and of 
Dr. Fred Schwarz’s Christian Anti-Communist Crusade).  The intervention by political 
officials in the Nixon administration resulted in IRS rejection of the exemption application 
of the Center for Corporate Responsibility, in 1973, which was overturned by a federal 
judge, who cited “political intervention” and a “political atmosphere generated by the White 
House in the Internal Revenue Service.”  Id. at 284-85. 
 115. See Bell, Wiretapping’s Fruits, supra note 44, at 25 (stating that electronic record-
keeping “removes the ‘practical obscurity’ of records that are ‘available’ but difficult to 
acquire and compile” and thus implicates privacy concerns) (footnote omitted). 
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taxpayers. 
At the same time, there are myriad reasons why an individual taxpayer 
might wish to keep investment information concealed from particular 
individuals or categories of people.  Some of these reasons are based on the 
individual’s desire to conceal the amount of his wealth (whether low or 
high).  In our society, lack of wealth is often considered a disadvantage or 
even a sign of lesser moral worth.116  Therefore, many individuals may 
wish to hide information about a low amount of wealth in order to maintain 
a good reputation with friends, family, acquaintances, potential business 
associates, potential creditors, or potential dates.  Some individuals may 
feel shame or embarrassment about their relative poverty; others might 
seek to avoid unsolicited advice about ways to improve their financial 
wellbeing. 
There are also situations in which being perceived as wealthy may be a 
disadvantage, and an individual would seek to hide his wealth.117  An 
individual’s wealth may make his employer reluctant to raise his salary.  A 
wealthy individual may receive undesired requests for gifts or loans from 
family and friends, or requests for charitable contributions.  An individual 
may live below his means and seek to hide his wealth from his children in 
an effort to develop their self-reliance and adherence to a modest life style.  
An individual may seek to hide his wealth from a prospective marriage 
partner to assure himself that the decision to marry him is based on other 
factors.  Finally, an individual may seek to hide his wealth to avoid having 
his friends who have lesser wealth feel uncomfortable around him,118 to 
avoid appearing boastful, or to foster a reputation for favoring “the little 
guy.”119 
                                                          
 116. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (describing how income levels can 
shape people’s opinions of themselves and of others). 
 117. See Slevin v. City of N.Y., 551 F. Supp. 917, 931-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, Barry v. City of N.Y., 712 F.2d 1554 (2d Cir. 1983) (discussing various 
reasons for concealing financial information, such as the wish to structure one’s family life 
without regard to one’s wealth; wanting to keep one’s finances secret from one’s spouse, 
especially in a relationship where both spouses have independent incomes; or wanting to 
avoid salespeople, investment seekers, and other commercial interests that target individuals 
with financial means). 
 118. See Terri Cullen, Fiscally Fit: Lasting Friendships Can Be Tough, WSJ.COM 
(Sept. 16, 2004) (noting that friends and neighbors are already able to compare each other 
on the basis of their consumption habits) (on file with the American University Law 
Review).  
 119. When Ralph Nader revealed details about his finances for the first time in 2000 
(immediately prior to receiving a presidential nomination by the Green Party), the press 
focused on the apparent inconsistency between his wealth and his political positions.  See, 
e.g., Advocate Rails Against Wealth, Is Worth Millions, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 19, 2000, 
at A4 (suggesting that Nader’s personal status as a multi-millionaire did not correlate with 
his outspoken political opposition to the concentration of America’s wealth in corporate 
hands); Mike Allen, Nader’s Worth at $3.8 Million; Green Party Hopeful Invested Heavily 
in Tech, WASH. POST, June 18, 2000, at A1 (noting that “[a]fter 35 years of bashing big 
business, rumpled Ralph Nader is worth at least $3.8 million and is heavily invested in 
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An individual may also have reasons for hiding particular investments 
from others with whom he has dealings or who know him by reputation.  
Some investments may be perceived as involving a conflict of interest 
(even when not violating any formal prohibition, such as might apply to a 
government official).120  For example, a doctor may not want his patients to 
know that he owns stock in a particular pharmaceutical company.  Some 
investments may be perceived as inconsistent with the political or social 
views that an individual displays, or with the views of his friends or 
colleagues.  For example, an environmental activist may not want his 
friends or supporters to know that he owns stock in a company that shows 
disregard for the environment.121  One may wish to conceal one’s 
ownership of stock in a casino from a religious relative who believes that 
gambling is sinful.  Alternatively, a taxpayer may want to avoid having his 
family or associates examine the wisdom of his investment strategy.  For 
example, an individual may not want to reveal a purchase of Enron stock 
shortly before it lost most of its value.  A person may want to avoid giving 
family members the opportunity to criticize an investment portfolio for lack 
of diversity or for excessive emphasis on investments in emerging markets. 
Overall, these reasons for hiding information about one’s investments 
seem legitimate and worthy of protection (even if they do not rise to the 
same level as the desire to avoid theft, kidnapping, or political dirty tricks).  
Moreover, it is difficult to argue that being an IRS employee should give 
someone a special license to ferret out others= secrets of this sort.  
Therefore, the development of reliable safeguards against browsing is 
highly desirable. 
Throughout the 1990s Congress received considerable evidence that 
some IRS employees were improperly browsing taxpayer=s records.122  In 
1997, Congress enacted legislation that made unauthorized inspection of a 
tax return by an IRS employee a criminal offense, if willful, and also 
                                                                                                                                      
technology stocks”); Nader Defends Wealth, Portfolio of Tech Stocks, CHI. TRIB., June 19, 
2000, at 10 (noting that “Nader, a longtime consumer advocate and critic of corporate 
America, is worth millions thanks to investments in high-tech companies”). 
 120. Under 18 U.S.C. § 208, an officer or employee of the executive branch is prohibited 
from participating personally and substantially in an official capacity in any particular 
matter in which, to the employee’s knowledge, he or any other person whose interests are 
imputed to him under this statute has a financial interest. 
 121. When Ralph Nader was questioned by reporters about his investments in 
technology stocks in 2000, he pointed out that his stock investments were in “the most 
neutral-type companies,” ones that were not monopolistic and did not “produce land mines, 
napalm, [or] weapons.”  He also said that he shunned tax shelters, including municipal 
bonds.  Allen, supra note 119, at A1. 
 122. See Cynthia Blum, Sharing Bank Deposit Information with Other Countries:  
Should Tax Compliance or Privacy Claims Prevail?, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 579, 616-17 (2004) 
(describing how unauthorized browsing by IRS employees led to a Senate Committee 
hearing and providing various examples of this practice). 
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authorized a suit for civil damages.123  This legislation apparently has not 
put an end to employee browsing.124  Nor is the security of IRS computers 
sufficient to preclude entirely the possibility of browsing by non-
employees.  However, there appears to be no reason that, in the long term, 
improvements in training of IRS employees, and new methods of 
prevention and detection in IRS computers125 could not minimize the extent 
of this browsing. 
Such improvements in safeguards against improper browsing would 
seem to be a better solution than removing investment information from the 
hands of the IRS through the adoption of a flat tax.  Even under the flat tax, 
the IRS would have a considerable amount of personal information about 
taxpayers that might be of interest to potential browsers and that taxpayers 
would have legitimate reasons for wishing to conceal.  This would include 
information about one’s dependents and filing status, detailed information 
about one’s salary, retirement income, and the income and expenses of 
                                                          
 123. See Taxpayer Browsing Protection Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-35, 111 Stat. 1104 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7213A (West 2002)) (imposing a criminal penalty 
consisting of a fine not to exceed $1,000 or a prison term of up to one year, or both).  The 
Act also provided civil damages for “unauthorized inspection of returns and return 
information.”  Pub. L. No. 105-35 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7431).  In addition, the 
changes require the IRS to notify a taxpayer if an employee is criminally charged with 
unauthorized inspection of the taxpayer’s return.  Id. 
 124. In the two years following the statute’s enactment, the Treasury substantiated 198 
cases of unauthorized browsing.  2000 JCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 174-75.  According to 
the report, these cases involved the following kinds of employees:  “auditors and tax 
examiners (77), collection (48), Taxpayer service (31), clerical (19), Criminal Investigation 
Division (3), Management (6), Professional/Technical (2) and other (12).”  Id. at 175; see 
also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONFIDENTIALITY OF TAX DATA:  IRS’ 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TAXPAYER BROWSING PROTECTION ACT (1999) (analyzing the 
Office of Chief Inspector’s investigations of instances of unauthorized access to IRS data), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/archiv 
e/1999/gg99043.pdf. 
 125. See 2000 JCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 178 (citing the IRS as having acknowledged 
in 2000 that, in the short-term, its computer systems are not capable of modification to 
prevent and promptly detect unauthorized browsing).  See also Memorandum from Pamela 
J. Gardiner, Deputy Inspector General for Audit, Dep’t. of the Treasury, July 8, 2005, in 
DEP’T. OF TREASURY, MANAGERS AND SYSTEM ADMINISTRATORS NEED TO LIMIT 
EMPLOYEES’ ACCESS TO COMPUTER SYSTEMS,  available at 2005 TNT 136-55 
(recommending that the IRS configure computer systems to automatically disable users’ 
accounts after fourty-five days of inactivity to prevent access by employees who leave the 
IRS or have changed job responsibilities); Memorandum from Pamela J. Gardiner, Deputy 
Inspector General for Audit, Dep’t. of the Treasury, March 15, 2005, in DEP’T. OF 
TREASURY, WHILE  PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, MANAGERS AND EMPLOYEES ARE STILL 
SUSCEPTIBLE TO SOCIAL ENGINEERING TECHNIQUES, available at 2005 TNT 52-27 
(recommending that IRS continue reminding employees of how hackers might seek to get 
access to passwords); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION SECURITY: 
INTERNAL REVENUE  SERVICE NEEDS TO REMEDY SERIOUS WEAKNESSES OVER TAXPAYER 
AND BANK SECRECY ACT DATA, APRIL 2005, REPORT TO THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 
available at 2005 TNT 73-42 (concluding that “[u]ntil IRS fully implements a 
comprehensive agencywide security program, its facilities, computing resources and [data] 
will remain vulnerable”). 
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one’s business.126  This could also include information uncovered in an 
audit and information about the nature of one’s interactions with the IRS.  
Under the flat tax, taxpayer concerns would continue to justify vigorous 
action to prevent unauthorized browsing. 
3.  Authorized disclosures to other government agencies 
Investment information obtained by the IRS may be disseminated much 
more widely than thus far indicated, because Congress has authorized a 
number of other federal and state agencies to receive tax return 
information127 for purposes other than federal tax administration.128  
Pursuant to section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, the IRS may make 
a disclosure to state tax officials for purposes of state tax administration;129 
to congressional committees and the Government Accounting Office 
(“GAO”) in certain cases;130 to a federal, state, or local agency 
administering various welfare or government assistance programs;131 to the 
U.S. Customs Service;132 to federal, state, and local child support 
enforcement agencies;133 and to certain federal officials for use in non tax-
related criminal investigations.134  As a result, in addition to IRS 
                                                          
 126. One might make the argument that business and employment activities are by their 
very nature open to public view and, hence, disclosure of information about such activities 
should not be feared.  However, some employment, consulting, and business activity can be 
conducted in the privacy of one’s home using nothing more than a telephone, fax machine, 
and computer.  Moreover, even if the nature of the activity is not hidden, the individual in 
such a situation still has an interest in avoiding disclosure of detailed information regarding 
salary, professional fees and expenses, business profits, and pension payments. 
 127. The Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation and the Department of the 
Treasury each carried out a thorough review of these disclosure rules at Congress’s request. 
See 2000 JCT REPORT, supra note 3, at 21-55 (providing a thorough description of each of 
these authorized disclosures and their limitations); 2000 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 89, 
at 42-94 (analyzing each of the disclosure authorizations and providing recommendations 
for further changes). 
 128. See supra note 3 (tracing Congress’s changing position towards IRS disclosures to 
other governmental entities). 
 129. I.R.C. § 6103(d)(1) (West 2002). 
 130. I.R.C. § 6103(f), (i)(8) (West 2002). 
 131. See I.R.C. § 6103(l)(7) (West 2002) (specifying that this information is to be used 
only for the purpose of determining eligibility or the correct amount of benefits). 
 132. I.R.C. § 6103(l)(14) (West 2002). 
 133. I.R.C. § 6103(l)(6) (West 2002). 
 134. I.R.C. § 6103(i)(1), (2), (3), (5), (7) (West 2002).  In addition, some federal and 
state agencies require individuals to provide a copy of the federal income tax return in 
certain circumstances.  See William J. Turnier, PAYE as an Alternative to an Alternative 
Tax System, 23 VA. TAX REV. 205, 210 (2003-2004) (noting that “[t]he individual income 
tax return has taken on a significant role as an informal provider of financial information 
about individuals in a variety of circumstances”).  Turnier cites the following examples:  (1) 
student loan applicants must file copies of their past tax returns as well as their parents’ past 
tax returns; (2) divorce lawyers routinely obtain copies of tax returns to assess the financial 
status of the parties, and judges  often use them to assess a party’s ability to provide alimony 
and child support; (3) banks regularly seek copies of past tax returns to make credit 
decisions; and (4) social service providers often request past tax returns to determine 
whether an applicant satisfies the agency’s need-based criteria.  Id. at 210-11; see also 
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 2003 ANNUAL REPORT TO 
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employees, a vast number of people have access to taxpayers’ investment 
information.135 
This increased access to IRS information raises a number of concerns.  
Some might argue that, despite the safeguards established by Congress,136 
such widespread disclosure cannot be adequately policed for leakage to 
unauthorized users.137  Others may argue that there is something inherently 
objectionable in the practice of allowing information that was obtained by 
the government for one purpose to be used for another unrelated 
governmental purpose, even if there is advance warning to the taxpayer.138  
Finally, some have warned that taxpayers will be less forthcoming in 
providing information to the IRS139 if they believe the information will be 
disclosed to other government agencies.140 
But none of these concerns (even if accepted as valid) necessarily 
                                                                                                                                      
CONGRESS 249 (2003) (noting that it has become customary for taxpayers applying for and 
obtaining mortgage loans to sign a Form 4506 (Request for Copy or Transcript of Tax 
Form) during the closing process), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/nta_2003_annual_update_mcw_1-15-042.pdf; 2000 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 89, at 
69-78 (providing a detailed discussion of  how tax return information is legitimately gained 
by third parties pursuant to taxpayer consent and noting that as technology advances, the 
number of third-party requests for taxpayer consents will only increase). 
 135. However, in a case where a taxpayer is simply required to provide a copy of Form 
1040, a copy may be filed that does not correspond to the version of the return that was filed 
with the IRS.  See supra note 134 (describing situations in which a taxpayer may be 
required to provide tax return information to an entity other than the IRS, such as a bank or 
an attorney). 
 136. See I.R.C. § 6103(p)(4), (5), (6) (West 2002). 
 137. See, e.g., IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED, supra note 79, at 9-18 (noting that a review 
of IRS safeguard procedures showed that these safeguards had not been adequately 
implemented). 
 138. See generally Lillian R. BeVier, Information about Individuals in the Hands of 
Government:  Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 455, 466 (1995) (examining whether information obtained by the government 
for a specific purpose should be disclosed to other government agencies for a different 
purpose without the individual’s consent).  BeVier notes that, on the other hand, the public’s 
interest in allowing disclosure by one agency to another can be quite high.  Id. at 476.  
BeVier states that “vis-à-vis the government generally, and its demands that citizens supply 
it with personal information in connection with its regulatory, welfare, revenue-raising, or 
crime-fighting agenda, an individual has very little in the way of a ‘privacy interest’ to be 
waived.”  Id. 
 139. This argument may have less relevance for information provided to the IRS through 
Form 1099 reporting because individuals have limited options for avoiding such reporting.  
 140. See, e.g., PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-7 (stating that 
“confidentiality of tax returns and related information is an essential element of preserving 
the effectiveness of the tax system in this country . . . [in] that widespread use of the 
information a taxpayer provides to the [IRS] . . . cannot help but diminish the taxpayer=s 
disposition to cooperate with the IRS voluntarily”); see also 2000 TREASURY REPORT, supra 
note 89, at 34 (stating that “[o]vertly tying tax reporting to needs-based government benefits 
may lead some individuals to underreport their income in order to qualify for such 
benefits . . . . Conversely, overtly tying tax reporting to the ability to qualify for loans, 
credit, etc., may lead some individuals to overreport their income . . . . In addition to these 
specific effects on tax compliance, there is the more general issue of confidence in the tax 
system”).  But see Mazza, supra note 4, at 1070-73 (stating that the link between 
confidentiality and taxpayer compliance has not been directly proven). 
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provide support for the adoption of a flat tax in order to reduce the amount 
of investment information in the hands of the IRS and, thus, available for 
disclosure to other agencies. A more direct response to these concerns 
would be for Congress to remove authorization for all or some of the 
disclosures that the IRS is allowed to make141 to other agencies, or to 
require greater safeguards as a precondition for making such disclosures.  
The latter approach might be criticized as unrealistic. 
Professor Peter Swire suggests that once the government incurs the costs 
of acquiring information for one purpose (e.g., enforcing the income tax), it 
becomes inefficient and therefore politically difficult to prevent its use for 
other legitimate government purposes (e.g., determining eligibility for 
social security benefits).  He feels that we may fall down a “slippery slope” 
leading to the “complete loss of privacy of highly personal information . . . 
[so that] tax returns might become essentially public documents.”142  But, 
as Swire recognizes, Congress has not actually allowed the IRS to disclose 
tax return information freely to all government agencies.143  Moreover, the 
boundaries that Congress established between authorized and unauthorized 
disclosures have remained relatively stable since 1976.144  It appears, 
                                                          
 141. See supra notes 127-134 and accompanying text (noting that the IRS may disclose 
information to certain government entities pursuant to section 6103 of the Internal Revenue 
Code). 
 142. Swire, supra note 59, at 498.  Swire discusses the fact that once the initial costs of 
building the database and infrastructure have been incurred, “then additional uses may be 
cost-justified that would otherwise not have been.”  Id. at 497.  As he explains, since “costs 
have already been incurred in the tax system to gather and organize . . . tax return data . . . 
there is a low incremental expense to transfer the data to other federal agencies and perhaps 
to state and local welfare and other agencies.”  Id. at 498.  Therefore, “an efficiency 
argument can . . . be made that additional uses of data, such as protecting against welfare 
fraud, should be authorized where the costs of gathering and organizing the comprehensive 
tax data would not have been justified solely to protect against welfare fraud.”  Id.  He 
points out that “[i]n recognition of this problem, there are federal laws [i.e., section 6103] 
restricting use of tax returns for other purposes.”  Id.  He further explains that “[i]f the 
government . . . already has fifteen uses for a category of data, it may be impossible 
politically to stop the sixteenth or seventeenth uses, even where those additional uses would 
never have been approved at the time the data collection system was first instituted.”  Id. at 
499. 
 143. See id. at 498 (noting that specific restrictions exist to limit the government’s use of 
tax returns and return information). 
 144. See 2000 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 89, at 3 (stating that although the 
disclosure laws have been amended since the implementation of the Tax Reform Act of 
1976, the Act’s basic statutory scheme remains in force today).  However, the Treasury 
Report also noted the addition of exceptions to section 6103 over the years since the Act’s 
enactment, noting that questions have arisen about whether the balance Congress intended 
to strike through section 6103 has been eroded.  Id. at 67.  For example, since the 1976 Act, 
new paragraphs (7) through (18) have been added to I.R.C. § 6103(l), a provision governing 
“disclosure of returns and return information for purposes other than tax administration.”  
See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13402(a), 107 Stat. 312, 563-64 (1993) (adding ¶ (13)); Pub. 
L. No. 103-182, § 522(a), 107 Stat. 2057, 2161 (1993) (adding ¶ (14)); Pub. L. No. 99-335, 
§ 310(a), 100 Stat. 514, 607-08 (1986) (adding ¶ (12)); Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 
2653(b)(3)(A), 98 Stat. 494, 1155 (1984) (adding ¶ (10)); Pub. L. No. 96-249, § 127(a)(1), 
94 Stat. 357, 365 (1980) (adding ¶ (7)). 
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therefore, that Congress is capable of making individualized determinations 
of whether IRS disclosures to a particular governmental agency or unit for 
a specific purpose are warranted.145 
Moreover, privacy concerns raised by authorized IRS disclosures to 
other government units under current law would not necessarily be 
resolved by Congress’s adoption of a flat tax.  Notwithstanding a repeal of 
the federal income tax, federal and state governments might continue to 
need information about an individual’s investment income.  For example, 
Congress would probably146 continue to require means-testing to determine 
eligibility for participation in certain federal programs, and some state 
governments might wish to continue to collect their revenue through an 
income tax.  If the Form 1099 reporting system for investment income were 
no longer required for administering federal taxes, Congress might still 
consider it necessary for these other purposes (whether administered by the 
IRS or another federal body).147  In that case, there might be no change in 
the broad dissemination of information about investment income to various 
government agencies, and the potential for leakage would remain 
unchanged. 
Alternatively, if the Form 1099 reporting system for investment income 
were abolished when a flat tax was adopted, particular federal agencies or 
state governments148 requiring the information might simply rely on 
                                                          
 145. See BeVier, supra note 138, at 503-04 (arguing that  
the appropriate answer to each question of whether a particular unconsented-to use 
ought to be permitted is highly context-specific.  Proper resolution depends on a 
multitude of variables including the purpose for which use or disclosure is desired 
and the efficiency gains its use would generate; the extent to which non-disclosure 
would permit the data subject to misrepresent herself to the recipient agency; the 
purposes for which the information was originally collected; the kind of 
information at issue (whether of a highly personal, intimate, or embarrassing 
nature); the subjective or objectively reasonable expectations of the data subject 
with respect to its subsequent use; and the unjustified adverse consequences that 
might befall the individual if the information is used for a different purpose” 
). 
 146. See Gene Steuerle, Taxing the Capital Income of Only the Poor and the Middle 
Class, 107 TAX NOTES 239 (Apr. 11, 2005) (explaining that currently Congress provides for 
a phasing out of benefits on the basis of income in many federal programs, such as food 
stamps, Pell grants, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, Medicaid, rental housing 
vouchers, school lunch programs, child care vouchers, and supplemental security income).  
Steuerle states that “advocates of consumption taxes never deal with how those various 
‘income tax layers’ within spending programs would be handled.”  But he concludes that 
“[f]rom what I have seen of all consumption tax proposals to date . . . those proposals do not 
change the income accounting required in all those other programs such as food stamps or 
EITC, even though they may eliminate the income tax.”  As a result, he argues, “all the 
lower- and middle-income households who receive educational or work-related or child or 
welfare or health benefits  . . . would need to fill out income tax forms for these other 
programs, because the IRS form no longer would be available to be sent as a substitute.”  Id. 
 147. See Strauss, supra note 33, at 419-21 (pointing out the difficulties that a state 
government might have in establishing its own information reporting program). 
 148. See Roin, supra note 9, at 333 (noting, as one of the ramifications of replacing the 
income tax with a value-added tax (“VAT”), that currently the state tax authorities “obtain 
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mandatory reporting by individuals, perhaps supplemented by selective 
audits.  This would not seem to offer any significant advantages in terms of 
privacy.  Honest individuals would continue to provide complete 
information about their investments to the requesting government agency; 
some unlucky individuals would be subjected to the intrusiveness of a 
detailed audit of their finances; and dishonest, risk-taking individuals 
would conceal information about their investment income149 at the expense 
of other citizens.  In conclusion, the flat tax does not seem to offer 
protection against any harm that might result when federal agencies or state 
governments seek information about an individual=s investment income. 
CONCLUSION 
I have sought to demonstrate that certain privacy concerns under the 
current income tax system may not be as serious as some suggest, and that 
other privacy concerns will continue even under the flat tax.  I have argued 
that the manner in which the IRS generally obtains information about 
investment income (Form 1040 or Form 1099) is not particularly 
intrusive.150  I have also argued that the use of this information solely by 
the IRS and solely for administration of the income tax does not in itself 
cause serious harm for taxpayers (other than their being required to pay 
their share of the income tax).151 
When information is misused by IRS officials or others, there is a 
potential for serious harm, and such misuse may not be able to be 
completely eradicated.  However, it does not appear that information held 
by the IRS contributes significantly to the crimes of theft, identity theft, or 
kidnapping, or to annoying solicitations for investment services or 
charitable contributions.  Moreover, the harms stemming from the use of 
taxpayer information for political purposes or from the browsing of 
taxpayer information by IRS employees or others would seem to be a 
                                                                                                                                      
considerable amounts of information from federal authorities on the auditing side, 
information generated by the federal government in the course of monitoring and auditing 
the implementation of the federal income tax,” such as, “information gleaned from its much 
more extensive system for matching information returns to individual and corporate 
returns”).  If the federal income tax is repealed, Roin concludes that state tax systems will 
become more costly to administer.  Id. 
 149. See BeVier, supra note 138, at 470-72 (arguing that it is not desirable for citizens to 
“mislead” the government as to facts that are relevant to application of its regulatory 
programs, as determined by Congress through legitimate processes); see also Allen, supra 
note 42, at 872 (noting that while public benefits such as “[w]elfare, Social Security, 
disaster relief, [and] student loans” should be available, “moral accountability in the form of 
personal financial disclosures” should be required in order to obtain these benefits). 
   150. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text (comparing mandatory information 
reporting to police searches and surveillance).  
 151. See supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text (noting that actual scrutiny by an IRS 
employee is rare and that even if such scrutiny occurs the IRS employee is a stranger and 
has little personal interest in the taxpayer’s investment income). 
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continuing concern under the flat tax, in that the IRS would continue to 
have information regarding taxpayers’ wages, pensions, business income 
and expenses, filing status, and dependents. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that the elimination of routine 
reporting of investment income under the flat tax would result in there 
being less information about taxpayers in the hands of the IRS, and thus 
less information vulnerable to potential leakage or abuse.  Peter Swire has 
suggested that information that is not placed in a government Avault@ is not 
at risk of Aleaking@ from the vault.152 
In light of this, why not simply accept the argument that adopting a flat 
tax would somewhat improve the privacy of American taxpayers?  This 
argument glosses over the fact that any new privacy benefits to be obtained 
would be distributed very unequally among taxpayers.153  As others have 
pointed out, the only significant investment assets of most taxpayers are 
their residences, their pensions, and their life insurance reserves.154  Since 
most taxpayers lack any significant amount of dividends, interest, or capital 
gains, the only increase in their privacy under the flat tax would be the 
ability to keep secret from government their lack of significant investment 
income.  If the flat tax is promoted as a boon for privacy, such individuals 
could justifiably feel that their privacy concerns are being taken less 
seriously than the privacy concerns of taxpayers with significant 
investment income.155  For the vast majority of taxpayers, the goal of 
greater privacy with respect to the tax code would be better served by 
strengthening safeguards against misuse of government information, rather 
than by providing complete protection for information about investment 
                                                          
 152. See Swire, supra note 59, at 478-79 (introducing the metaphor of our financial data 
being in a “vault 600 feet down,” and “each use of data as a pipeline going from the vault to 
the surface”). Swire argues that “[w]hen there are inadequate controls on data that leave the 
vault, then one might have filters on flows into the vault.”  Id. at 484. 
 153. See id. at 505-06 (noting that “[n]ew surveillance technologies may have 
disproportionate impacts on different economic classes or racial or other groups”).  For 
example, Swire points out that electronic benefits transfers for food stamps “apply 
predominantly to the poor and to minority groups that are disproportionately poor [while] 
the rich, the well-educated, and the savvy may also have ways, unavailable to the poor, to 
avoid or reduce government surveillance.”  Id.; see also William J. Stuntz, The Distribution 
of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1267 (1999) (arguing that 
under the Fourth Amendment, “the kind of privacy protection citizens have vis-à-vis the 
police is tied to the kind of privacy protection the same citizens have with one another [and 
since t]hat kind of privacy can be bought . . . people with more money have more of it than 
people who don’t”). 
 154. See Kurtz, supra note 9, at 166 (noting that the average taxpayer’s wealth primarily 
consists of a home, life insurance, and interests in a pension plan and the social security 
retirement system).  Citing IRS statistics based on 1997 returns, Kurtz notes that out of the 
5.8% of returns with adjusted gross income in excess of $100,000, “fewer than 6% . . . 
reported over 67% of taxable interest, dividends and gains.”  Id. at 168. 
 155. Cf. BOK, supra note 81, at 27 (arguing that “[w]hatever control over secrecy and 
openness we conclude is legitimate for some individuals should, in the absence of special 
considerations, be legitimate for all”). 
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income alone. 
Concerns about privacy should not play an important role in the debate 
about the desirability of adopting a flat tax. Instead, the debate should focus 
on considerations of fairness, administrability, and economic effects.  
Regardless of the outcome of this debate, the government and the IRS will 
continue to collect a great amount of information about Americans.  We 
will need to rely on the rules enacted by Congress, on the adherence to 
these rules by the agency, and on continuing judicial scrutiny to prevent 
abuses. 
